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ABSTRACT
5,424 Japanese prisoners were captured by Allied
forces during World War II and brought to the United States
for internment.
these men.

No scholarly account has been written of

This thesis will explain why there were so few,

where they were interned, and the conditions of their
internment.
The topic was researched at the National Archives and
Records Administration in Washington, D. C., through inter
views with veterans who served in the Pacific Campaign or
had contact with the Japanese prisoners, through newspaper
and magazine articles of the time, and through secondary
sources of the Pacific Campaign.
The Campaign in the Pacific became a brutal race war,
with few prisoners taken.

Even those taken were not gua

ranteed to make it back to the United States for intern
ment.

However, those who did were treated well, in light

of their circumstances.
different factors:

This was the result of three

those in charge of the Japanese con

finement saw the prisoners as humans, America did not want
the Japanese to retaliate against U.S. prisoners for

vi

actions taken against the Japanese prisoners, and the U.S.
was trying to gain the cooperation of the prisoners, who
responded better to kindness than to abuse, against which
they were more prepared.

vn

CHAPTER ONE

THE FEW, THE HUMBLED

From the capture of Kazuo Sakamaki, the United States'
first prisoner of war in World War II, to the capture of
the last in August of 1945, only 5,424 Japanese prisoners
were brought to the continental United States.^

Although

the first American prisoner— and the only one for over six
months--was Japanese, the Japanese prisoners trickled in
only a few at a time and they were soon heavily outnumbered
by both German and Italian prisoners.

The number of Japa

nese prisoners entering the U.S. did not even exceed 100
until March, 1944, when after two years of fighting, 206
prisoners were brought in from the Pacific.

In fact, the

Battles of the Java Sea, Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal,
Savo Island, Bismark Sea, New Guinea, Kula Gulf, Bougain
ville, Tarawa, and Makin combined only netted the Allied
forces 604 prisoners.

Only when the emperor issued his

order condemning suicide in the Philippines did numbers
begin to increase in any significant measure.^

One reason

for this small number of prisoners was the Japanese
soldiers' aversion to capture.

1
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Ruth Benedict, a sociologist who studied the Japanese
during World War II, tried to explain the Japanese aversion
to capture through an understanding of their culture.

The

Japanese, she explained, were taught from childhood that
certain debts were owed to many people, including the
emperor, parents, ancestors, teachers, and various superi
ors.

These debts were known as on and were seen as un

avoidable disgraces.

Everyone worked all of their lives

to repay the debt of on, but it could never be fully ret

C

paid.

It would be impossible, they feel, to be
glad of one's country, of one's life, of one's
great and small concerns without thinking also
of receiving these benefits. In all Japanese
history [the] ultimate person among living men
to whom one was indebted was the highest supe
rior within one's horizon. It has been at
different periods the local seignor, the feudal
lord, and the Shogun.
[During World War II] it
[was] the Emperor. . . . Every partiality they
have for their own way of living increases each
man's Imperial 'on'; every cigarette distribut
ed to the Army on the front lines in the
Emperor's name during the war underscored the
'on' each soldier wore for him; every sip of
sake doled out to them before going into battle
was a further Imperial 'on'.
Every kamakazi
pilot of a suicide plane was, they said, repay
ing his Imperial 'on'; all the troops who, they
claimed, died to a man defending some island of
the Pacific were said to be discharging their
limitless 'on' to the Emperor.
However, according to Benedict, on contributed to the
Japanese aversion to capture in another way as well.
Accepting any gift or aid forces the recipient to accept on
from their benefactor.

While this was accepted practice,
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it was very offensive.

"Casual favors from relative

strangers [were] the ones most resented, for with neighbors
and in old, established hierarchical relationships a man
knows and has accepted the complication of on.
mere acquaintances and near equals men chafe.

But with
They would

prefer to avoid getting entangled in all the consequences
■7
of on."
Thus, whxle American chivalry requires the hero
to come to the rescue of a man in trouble, "Japanese valor
repudiates such salvaging. . . .

There was virtue only in

accepting life or death risks." 8
Any Occidental army which has done its
best and finds itself facing hopeless odds
surrenders to the enemy. They still regard
themselves as honorable soldiers and by inter
national agreement their names are sent back to
their country so that their families may know
that they are alive. They are not disgraced as
either soldiers or citizens or in their own
families. But the Japanese defined the situa
tion differently. Honor was bound up with
fighting to the death. In a hopeless situation
a Japanese soldier should kill himself with his
last hand grenade or charge weaponless against
the enemy in a mass suicide attack. But he
should not surrender. Even if he were taken
prisoner when he was wounded and unconscious,
he 'could not hold up his head in Japan' again;
he was disgraced; he was dead to his former
life.°
Thus, surrender, where a person must owe his life not
only to a stranger, but to an enemy, was the most extreme
disgrace to the Japanese. Therefore, even the most wounded
or helpless soldiers normally preferred death to surrender.
Navy Captain Matao Okino, one of the most senior
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Japanese prisoners held in the United States during World
War II, felt that the Bushido Code or "the way of the
Warrior" was the reason for this mindset.

He listed six

precepts he felt were vital to the battlefield psychology
of the Japanese soldier:
1. Although life is important, death is
lighter than a bird's feather.
2. Not only has the soldier no fear of
death, but going a step further, he will not
die before he overthrows his enemy.
3. The spirit of the deathless patriotism
of Kusunoki Kasashigi (a historical figure of
the 14th century noted for his loyalty to the
Emperor Godaigo.)
4. Because there is a country, the family
exists; because the is a country, the individu
al exists; therefore, loyalty and filial piety
are the same.
5. Death in battle is not only an indi
vidual honor but family honor, and this idea is
constantly handed down to children.
6. A prisoner of war not only brings
disgrace on himself but also on his family,
and, destroying the honor of his country, casts
the shadow of disgrace on future generations. u
These precepts can be traced directly back to the
Bushido Code of the Samurai, which itself can be traced
back to the earliest history and religion of the Japanese
people.

By the eighth century, the chief of the Yamato

clan, the dominant clan, had become Emperor.

The chroni

cles, Kojiki and Nihonqi, which developed the Japanese
creation mythology, helped to establish his sovereignty by
tracing his ancestry to Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, who was

5

the most powerful of the Japanese deities.

Later, as Japan

developed a feudal system, his sovereignty was upheld by
the Shoguns, who used the myth of his ancestry to maintain
their own power, and the deity of the Emperor became a
fundamental precept of Japanese religious life.

This

brought about a fierce loyalty to the emperor and nation,
which, by the 13th century, had been expanded and developed
into the cardinal virtue of the Bushido Code of the
Samurai.

With the entrance of Zen Buddhism to Japan,

teaching self-discipline and intuitive "right thinking",
and Confucianism, which insisted on respect for traditional
authority, this Bushido Code developed into an ethic of
absolute loyalty and unhesitating sacrifice.^^
During the same time, there also developed a form of
ritual suicide known as seppuku or hari-kiri (bellyslitting) .

The act of hari-kiri proper can be traced back

to a 12th century warrior who "ripped open his belly with a
sword rather than face capture" and thus set free his
spirit, but the practice of the Japanese warrior committing
suicide rather than succumbing to capture dates well before
that.

However, for centuries, the practice was reserved

by law to the samurai.

Only in 1887, when the Meiji gov

ernment abolished the samurai caste and destroyed its last
defenders in the Satsuma Rebellion, was the practice em
braced by others.

The Meiji forces, conscripts of all

ranks and classes, overpowered the last defenders of the
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Samurai tradition, who were led by Field Marshall Takemori
Saigo, the former commander of the Imperial Guard.

When

hope was lost, Saigo and his followers killed themselves in
full view of Meiji's troops.

This act so impressed the

Meiji troops that they adopted the tradition.

Thus, the

Meiji government, intending to discredit and destroy the
samurai, instead filled their conscripted forces with the
samurai spirit as the troops viewed themselves from that
• 13
day on as the new samurai.
The Meiji government continued the evolution of the
Japanese Bushido code in other ways as well.

Shinto became

the national religion of Japan, demanding absolute "loyalty
to the Emperor, divine head of the national family, at one
with and indivisible from the concept of Dai Nippon ('Grea
ter Japan')."^

A Conscription Law made all men between

17 and 40 liable for seven years of military duty (three
years active duty and four years in the reserve).

When

draftees protested, a Soldier's Code, listing the seven
duties of the soldier--loyalty, unquestioning obedience,
courage, the controlled use of physical force, frugality,
honor, and respect for superiors— soon followed.

The

government also developed a modern school system, and in
the late 1870's, began to impose controls over its educa
tional content.
"The Meiji authorities wanted education to turn out
citizens who spontaneously and enthusiastically supported
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national policies.

A willingness to die for the country in

time of war was stressed as 'loyalty to the emperor and
love of country'.

Every subject was "systematically

inculcated" with militarism at the beginning of the RussoJapanese war and the militaristic taint stayed with the
education system until the end of World War II.

"Starting

in 1925, active duty military [personnel] were assigned to
every school from the middle school level up (except girls'
schools), and military training became part of the regular
curriculum.

The next year youth training centers were

established in every city, town, and village as part of a
four-year program of four hundred hours of military in
struction for males whose formal education ended at elementary school."

In this way, the military gained control

over the training of everyone, the sons of the middle and
upper classes in school and the sons of the poor with the
youth training centers.
Militarism gained control over textbooks as well.

In

1880, the government compiled a list of books prohibited
for use as textbooks. 1ft Six years later, all textbooks
were required to be certified by the Ministry of Education
before adoption.

Compulsory education was established,

attaining an enrollment rate of over 90 percent, and then
increased from three years to six years.

Finally, in 1904,

the Ministry of Education began to compile each of the
texts used at the primary levels, which was the only
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education most Japanese received.

These books developed

the same militaristic tinge that the rest of the education
al system contained.

For example, lesson 7 from Elementary

School Reader No. £3, published in 1904, was entitled "Takeo
Joins the Service" and included the following exchange:
Takeo: Father, the idea of 'joining the
service of my country' makes me so proud and
happy. I'll be trained and when war comes, I
will not be afraid to die. I'll give every
thing I have to show what a good Japanese
fighting man is made of.
Father: That's the spirit! You must be
that determined.
Don't be afraid to die.
Don't worry about us here. And you must always
be faithful to the Imperial Precepts to Sol
diers and Sailors. ^
A second story, called "A Sailor's Mother", was in
another elementary reader:
A sailor receives a letter from his moth
er: "You wrote that you did not participate in
the battle of Toshima Island. You were in the
August 10 attack on Weihaiwei but you didn't
distinguish yourself with an individual ex
ploit. To me this is deplorable. Why have you
gone to war? Your life is to be offered up to
requit [sic] your obligations to our benevolent
Emperor." An officer, seeing him reading the
letter and crying, comforted the sailor:
"Son,
there'll surely be another glorious war before
long. Let's accomplish great feats of bravery
then and bring honor to our ship Takachiho.
Explain that to your mother and put her mind at
ease.
The government also issued the Imperial Rescript to
Soldiers and Sailors of 1882, which all ranks were required
to learn by heart and meditate on daily, and the Rescript

9

on Education of 1890.

These taught that "duty is more

weighty than a mountain; death is no heavier than a feath
er."

Yamagata Arimoto, a forceful advocate of the re

scripts, wrote that "the indispensable elements of a for
eign policy to protect [Japan's] interests are first,
troops and armaments and second, education.

Education

■ •
?1
should foster and preserve patriotism."
This training, and the Imperial Rescripts, elevated
the Bushido virtues to the status of sacred obligations and
made hari-kiri the only viable alternative to failure in
war.

This helped to cause tragedies like the one at Sai

pan.

"When American occupation of Saipan became inevita

ble, approximately 200 Japanese soldiers and sailors were
issued poison by their officers for the purpose of commit
ting suicide.

The poison was a white powder diluted with

water, and had a very bitter taste.

In a formal ceremony,

the cry 'Bonzai for the Emperor' was repeated three times
and the poison drunk.

The men started dying about four

•
•
•
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mxnutes
after drinking
the poison."
There were other, more pragmatic reasons for the
Japanese refusal to surrender, however.

The Japanese

military told its soldiers that since surrender was a
disgrace to the entire country, any soldier who was cap
tured and then returned to Japan would be executed, which
was not true.

Japanese prisoners taken in Bataan had been

"court-martialed to determine how much information they had
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divulged to the U.S. forces, but other than this were in no
way shamed" after their release.

Prisoners who had been

captured and released from the Russians or Chinese were
tested for Communistic tendencies and "those considered
'reformed' were immediately discharged from the Army and
returned to their villages. Thus,

the only prisoners

executed were those deemed to have 'Communistic tenden
cies' .

However, most Japanese soldiers were not in

formed of this, so the propaganda against surrender was
quite successful.

Captain Okino noted that "the honor,

succor, and solace from both the government and people for
the families of those who die in battle leaves nothing to
be desired," but "when a man becomes a prisoner of war, he
is condemned to death, regardless of the reason for his
capture.

Moreover, this punishment will affect his entire

family and relatives."

O C

.

.

.

"If and when a conscript dies in

action or is, after having been missing for an unstipulated
(perhaps three months) period, by the War Ministry declared
dead, the employer's salary to dependents ceases, and that
Ministry provides support (amount not made public) for the
9f
widow and children until full sixteen years of age."
A
POW's family, not receiving this support, would wind up on
the streets, destitute.
Several other prisoners reiterated Captain Okino's
statements in the course of their interrogations, although
some expressed hope that they might be "let off with life
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imprisonment" because of extenuating circumstances, such as
debilitating wounds or unconsciousness during capture.
They hoped that a furyo, a man captured against his will,
would be better off than a horyo, a man who voluntarily
surrendered, but every prisoner felt sure he faced "execu•
•
■
■
•
27
tion,
imprisonment,
or, at best, social
ostracism".
Thus, the Japanese used a modern Bushido Code to encourage
their men against surrender and backed it up with threats
of punishment and death.
When the tide of war began to turn against Japan,
commanders, forced to use second-rate troops, began using
other means to discourage surrender as well.

They main

tained discipline and ensured the "fighting spirit" of
their troops by telling their soldiers that there was no
alternative to death, since American troops would torture
and kill any prisoners they captured.
to this propaganda.

Rumors were added

"The Chinese were reported to roast

their captives and cut out their hearts.

Young American

men, it was said, gualified for the Marine Corps by murder
ing their parents, and routinely raped and killed women in
Asia. . . .

The Allies killed prisoners on the battle

fields by laying them on the ground and running them over
with tanks and bulldozers, and intended to drastically
depopulate Japan itself if they won."

This propaganda

was given credibility by several atrocities carried out by
Allied front line troops and was quite successful.

When
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captured, the Japanese prisoners expressed amazement at the
treatment they received and told of the horrors they had
come to expect.

"In a report dated June 1945, the U.S.

Office of War Information noted that 84 percent of one
group of interrogated Japanese prisoners (many of them
injured or unconscious when captured) stated that they had
expected to be killed or tortured by the Allies if taken
prisoner.

The OWI analysts described this as being

typical . . ."30
Because of these conditions, "most of the enemy taken
prisoner either were badly wounded or were unconscious;
they could not prevent capture or commit suicide before
falling into American hands."

OI

"On Guadalcanal between

40-45 thousand Japanese soldiers participated.

Of this

number approximately three thousand were evacuated and less
than one thousand captured, many of these being
l a b o r e r s . I n July, 1944, the Allied Translation and
Intelligence Service reported that only 78 of the 1,115
prisoners they held had surrendered.

However, even

severe wounds did not guarantee a Japanese soldier's life
would be spared if capture was imminent.

Many times,

wounded soldiers who could not be evacuated easily with
retreating troops were shot by their own officers or medi
cal personnel or given hand grenades to kill t h e m s e l v e s .
Only at the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 did this
mindset change.

"In November 1944, the emperor was said to
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have issued an order that should an important place, such
as the Philippines, fall to the enemy, the commanding
officer would not be held responsible and should not commit
.

.

suicide."

Q R

.

"In February 1945, troops m

.

.

.

the Philippines

received an order not to kill themselves if their position
became hopeless, but to try to escape since men would be
needed after the war."JD
Japanese policies and propaganda were not the only
reasons for the insignificant number of Japanese prisoners;
the reluctance of American soldiers to capture their
"treacherous" enemy contributed to this tragic situation as
well.
The attitude of many American soldiers that "the only
good Jap is a dead Jap" kept a large number of potential
prisoners from ever reaching American lines.

Some Japa

nese prisoners reported that they had tried to surrender
several times, but "every time American soldiers saw a Jap
they would shoot at him and so [they] had no opportunity to
surrender."

OO

An American report backed this statement up,

noting that "documents pertaining to Japanese prisoners
were 'full of accounts of ingenious schemes devised by
POW's to avoid being shot while trying to give themselves
up' due to the fact of 'surrender being made difficult by
the unwillingness to take prisoners' on the part of Allied
fighting men."

OQ

Another American report stated that "a

Marine Raider Battalion, while on a patrol, ran across a
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Japanese Hospital bivouac area.

Over four hundred, includ

ing patients and corpsmen were killed, but although large
amounts of Hospital supplies and equipment were captured,
no prisoners were taken.
Although official U.S. government policy required that
prisoners be taken whenever possible, many commanding
officers refused to pass along these orders, explaining
"There's too much risk attached to taking prisoners and I'm
not going to ask any of my men to take any . . . .
Others took an even harder line against prisoners. On at
least one occasion, a "commanding officer censured his men
from a lower unit for bringing in prisoners, saying-'Don't bother to take prisoners, shoot the sons of
bitches!'"42

"Admiral William Halsey, soon to become the

commander of the South Pacific Force, vowed after Pearl
Harbor that by the end of the war Japanese would be spoken
only in hell, and rallied his men thereafter under such
slogans as 'Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs.'"^
Because of attitudes such as these, horrifying incidences
were reported without official reprimand.

One, involving

the U.S. submarine Wahoo, is a prime example.

After sink

ing a freighter and a transport from a four-ship convoy,
"Mush" Morton, the skipper of Wahoo, brought his vessel to
the surface:
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The water was so thick with enemy soldiers
that it was literally impossible to cruise
through them without pushing them aside like
driftwood. These were the troops we knew had
been bound for New Guinea, to fight and kill
our own men, and Mush, whose overwhelming
biological hatred of the enemy we were only now
beginning to sense, looked about him with
exultation at the carnage . . . .
"There must be close to ten thousand of
them in the water," said Roger Paine's voice.
"I figure about nine thousand five hundred
of the sons-a-bitches," Morton calculated.
Whatever the number, Morton was determined
to kill every single one. He ordered the deck
guns to open fire. Some of the Japanese,
Morton said later, returned the fire with
pistol shots. To Morton, this signaled 'fair
game.'. . . . Later, Morton reported tersely,
"After about an hour of this, we destroyed all
the boats and most of the troops."
A vicious circle had developed in which the Japanese
reluctance to surrender and Allied disinterest in taking
prisoners had meshed sickeningly, with horrifying
results.Thus,

"by the final year of the war, one out of

four U.S. combatants stated that his primary goal was not
to help bring about Japan's surrender, but simply to kill
as many Japanese as possible.
The callous attitude of the Americans developed in
many ways.

Some front-line soldiers were terrified of

Japanese treachery.

The 2nd Marine Battalion had captured

several prisoners on Guadalcanal.

The prisoners rubbed

their bellies and asked for food.

When food was offered,

they said that their whole unit was hungry and wanted to
surrender.

The battalion followed their captives until

they reached a ravine.

There the prisoners explained that
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the trip would take a long time and suggested that the unit
rest up for a bit.

As the Americans settled down and

removed their gear, they were fired upon by the very Japa
nese they had set out to capture.

Many were slaughtered

and those who made it back were reprimanded for losing
their friends and much of their gear.

Few were ready to

trust a surrendering Japanese soldier again . ^
Others had heard of such Japanese atrocities and were
eager to return the favor.

Charles Lindbergh noted the

common feeling that "a Japanese soldier who cuts off an
American soldier's head [was] an Oriental barbarian,

'lower

than a rat', [but] an American soldier who slits a Japanese
throat 'did it only because he knew the Japs had done it to
AQ
.
.
his buddies.'"
Even Time magazine displayed this atti
tude, noting that "low flying fighters turned lifeboats
towed by motor barges, and packed with Jap survivors, into
bloody sieves. Loosed on the Japs was the same ferocity
•
.
4Q
which they had often displayed."
Souvenir hounds joined in the melee as well, eager to
smuggle stolen items back home and knowing that they could
not pilfer a living prisoner's belongings.

One officer at

the front observed that "a Japanese officer, having his
sword on him, had as much chance of being captured alive as
a sheep chased by a pack of wolves" because of the American
•
.
Ro
"mania" for owning a Japanese saber.
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This callousness towards prisoners had severe reper
cussions and was extremely hard to break.

"It took the

promise of three days leave and some ice cream to bring in
the first Army prisoner.

This broke the ice but the flow

of prisoners was still s l o w . I n

August, 1944, Lindbergh

was informed that "'the officers wanted some prisoners to
question but couldn't get any until they offered two weeks
leave in Sydney for each one turned in.
than they could handle.'

Then they got more

But when they cut out giving

leave, the prisoners stopped coming in.

The boys just said

they couldn't catch any.'"
Even when a prisoner was captured, this did not guar
antee his safe escort to the U.S.

R.J. Maness, a Marine

corporal who fought in the Pacific, admitted that "some
Japanese smarted off and did not make it back.

Any of our

men that killed Japanese after they were captured were
violating battalion policy, but it was done."

In another

battalion, an officer noted that "even when prisoners were
taken . . . , they were lined up and asked
could speak English.

Those who were able to speak English

were taken for questioning.
taken.'"

which ones

The others 'simply weren't

Official papers also show that "on several

occasions, word was telephoned in from the front line that
a prisoner had been taken, only to find after hours of
waiting that the prisoner had 'died' enroute to the rear.
In more than one instance there was strong evidence that

18

the prisoner had been shot and buried because it was too
• m•. " R5
much bother to take him
Even when a prisoner was captured and sent to the
rear, it was still not certain that he would be shipped to
the U.S.

Although the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary

of War had signed an agreement saying that all prisoners
captured by U.S. troops would be transferred to the War
Department and delivered to the U.S., many exceptions were
made.

On one occasion, General MacArthur made special

arrangements with the Australian government to have them
hold "approximately [400] American-owned prisoners of war
captured in the Pacific fighting" and maintain them through
a reverse lend lease agreement.

On another occasion, the

Navy made an informal agreement with New Zealand in which
New Zealand accepted the custody and responsibility of 700
U.S. Navy POW's, just as if New Zealand had captured them.
The Navy explained that the prisoners were captured in the
Solomon Islands and were transferred to the New Zealand
government because there was no safe, reliable transport
back the U.S.

Those prisoners valuable for interrogation

purposes, however, were ultimately to be transported to
allied interrogation facilities in Australia.

cr O

Since no

deals relating to the transfer of POW's were made at a
national level with either New Zealand or Australia and
since most of the field records have been destroyed, few
records exist of the transactions made and many of the
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records that do exist give conflicting results.

For this

reason, and since it was difficult to determine which
prisoners were captured by each individual government
during a joint campaign, no exact count can be given of the
U.S. prisoners held by other countries and even less is
• ■
59
known about the exact details of their captivity.
Other prisoners were held in Hawaii, Saipan, Leyte,
Luzon, and Mindanao.60

In fact, as of 11 July 1945, the

U.S. had captured approximately 14,000 prisoners,

and at

least 8,664 Japanese prisoners were held by or for the
United States outside of its continental boundaries.

ft
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Although 14,000 prisoners may sound like a large
group, the number of prisoners captured in the Pacific was
less than a fraction of the prisoners who poured into the
U.S. from Europe and not all of the captured Japanese
prisoners were front-line soldiers.

U.S. War Department

Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, stated that "the
Armed Forces of the belligerent parties may consist of
combatants and noncombatants.

In the case of capture by

the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of
war."

In addition, "Individuals who follow armed forces

without directly belonging thereto, such as correspondents,
newspaper reporters, sutlers, contractors, who fall into
the enemy's hands and whom the latter thinks expedient to
detain, shall be entitled to be treated as prisoners of
war, provided they are in possession of a certificate from
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the military authorities of the armed forces which they
were accompanying."0^

Although the Japanese did not plan

for the capture of their men and these documents were not
provided, most front-line soldiers did not know about the
reguired certificate and gave no consideration as to wheth•
•
er their captive was military
or not.6 ^

Thus, prisoners captured ranged from first-rate front
line forces to illiterate laborers and Koreans, and from
medical personnel to Japanese "comfort girls," the latter
creating quite a bit of commotion among their guards.
There was even a woman sniper, captured on Eniwetok, and a
few Japanese-Americans who had chosen to fight for Japan.66
The average prisoner, however, "from the beginning of the
New Guinea campaign up to May 1944 was of average or above
average standard of education, under 30, from a 'city
occupation' (artisans or clerks), single, enlisted in the
Army, and was captured rather than surrendering of his own
free will."67

CHAPTER ONE END NOTES

1. Arnold Krammer, "Japanese Prisoners of War in
America," Pacific Historical Review 52, No. 1 (February
1983): 67.
2. U.S. Provost Marshall General, "Reports on Prison
ers of War", 1942-1946.
3.

Krammer,

70.

4.
U.S. Provost Marshall General, Reports on Prison
ers of War, 1942-1946.
5. Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946), 116.
6.

Ibid., 101.

7.

Ibid., 104.

8.

Ibid., 36.

9.

Ibid., 38.

10. Matao Okino, The Japanese Spirit of Dying With
Honor, 17 December 1944, Record Group 38, Records of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence,
Special Activities Branch (OP 16—Z ), Records of the Navy
Unit, Tracy, California, #64 Tracy, (Japanese), OP 16-FE,
Special Translations, 5 February 1945, National Archives
Records Administration, Modern Military Branch.
(All notes
specifying a Record Group are found in the National Ar
chives and Records Administration-Modern Military Branch.
Also, all Japanese names will be written in the Occidental
fashion.)
11.
Richard O'Neill, Suicide Squads of World War II
(New York: Military Heritage Press, 1981), 11-12; and
Merion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise
and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army (New York: Random
House, 1991), 4-7.
12.

O'Neill, 12.

13.

Ibid., 14.
21

22

14.

Ibid., 10.

15.

Harries, 22-24.

16. Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, World War II and
the Japanese, 1931-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978),
22.
(At the time this book was published, Professor Ienaga
was presenting a case before the Japanese Supreme Court
against government textbook certification.) For more on
the militarization of education, see Harries, 40-41.
17.

Ibid., 28.

18.

Ibid., 19.

19. Ministry of Education (Japanese). Elementary
School Reader No.
Quoted in Ienaga, 25.
20.

Ienaga, 25-26.

21.

Ibid., 22.

22. Confidential memo WCJ-612 to Commander John L.
Riheldaffer, 1 May 1945, p 24-25, Record Group 38, Records
of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelli
gence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the
Navy Unit, Tracy, California, File #59, Jap-Tracy (hereaf
ter cited as Memo WCJ-612).
23. Supplement to Enemy Alien Interrogation Report
(EA 5929 - Report XIVCAEI0082) dated 9 April 1945, Record
Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z),
Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number
or name.
24. Memo for OP 16-W Subject: Captain Matao Okino,
dated 13 June 1945, p. 2, Record Group 38, Records of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence,
Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy
Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.
25.

Memo WCJ-612, 24-25.

26. Interrogation Report on 14002, Pvt lcl, dated 14
July, 1943. Record Group 165, Records of the War Depart
ment General and Special Staffs, Country File - Japan, POW
Information. See also: Interrogation Report of ISN-14J-43,
Warrant Officer, p.2, Record Group 165, Country File, Japan
- Reports, Interrogation to Interrogation Extracts, Inter
rogation - Japanese, Volume 2, Assistant Chief of Staff,

23

G-2, Intelligence Division, Captured Personnel and Material
Branch, Enemy POW Interrogation File (MIS-Y), 1941-1945.
(Hereafter cited as RG 165, Interrogations, noting the
volume number.)
27. Interrogation Report of 9W-J-14009-MI, Superior
Private Sekine, Jisaku (Sato, Kunio), 31 July 1943, p. 1,
report by ONI of P/W Kawamura, 22 October 1943, p. 1,
Interrogation Report of 9W-J-14009-MI, PFC Kimura, 26 July
1943, p. 2, RG 165, Interrogations (Volume 1).
28. Interrogation Report of 9W-J-14009-MI, Superior
Private Sekine, Jisaku (Sato, Kunio),6 August 1943, p. 2,
Undated Interrogation Report of 9W-J-14025-MI, Civilian,
Nishimura, Kanjiro, p. 10, Interrogation Report of PFC,
14007, Hatakeyama, July 15,1943, p. 1, RG 165, Interroga
tions (Volume 1). See also: Excerpt from MIS Report on
Sgt. Kusama, Kazuo, Serial #51J-11396, dated 5 June 1945,
No. 1673, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activi
ties Branch(OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945, Byron Hot
Springs, Letters from April to 6 August 1945; Frank L.
Kluckhohn,
"Japanese Employ Torture as Spur," New York
Times, 30 January 1944, column 5, 28; and Roy E. Appleman,
James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, U.S.
Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Okinawa: The
Last Battle, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division,
Department of the Army, 1948), 386 and 462.
29. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy, Race and Power
in the Pacific War, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 6162.
30. Foreign Morale Analysis Division, Bureau of
Overseas Intelligence, Office of War Information: Japanese
Use of American Statements and Acts, Real or Alleged, in
Propaganda to Create Fear (Report #21, June 15, 1945), 4-7;
Principal Findings Regarding Japanese Morale During the War
(Report #26, September 20, 1945), pp. 8-10, Record Group
208, Box 444, quoted in Dower, 68.
31.

Appleman, 384.

32. John A. Burden, "The Work of the Language Section
including a Summary of the Work Conducted on Guadalcanal
and a Tentative Plan for the Future Conduct of Japanese
Language Work in the South Pacific Area", p. 8, Record
Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z),
Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, no file number
or name (hereafter cited as Burden).

24

33. Letter received at Tracy, California on 12 July
1944 from P. S. Primrose, S/Leader, Senior Intelligence
Officer, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special
Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit,
Tracy, California, no file number or name (hereafter cited
as Primrose letter).
34. Supplementary to report of 9W-J-14020-MI, Pvt
lclass, Kitakoshi, Kitchi, dated 13-14 September 1943, p.
12, Interrogation report of 9W-J-14009-MI, Superior Private
Sekine, Jisaku (Sato, Kunio) dated 31 July 1943, p. 1.,
Interrogation report on Pvt 1 class 14007 Hatakeyama dated
July 15, 1943, p. 1, Correction memo of interrogation
report on 14005, Private 1 class Takahashi, Tomimotso dated
9 July 1943, RG 165, Interrogations (Volume 1).
35. Confidential memo to Commander H. T. Gherardi
from James T. Wood, 7 July 1945, WCJ-691, p. 14, Record
Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z),
Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, File #59 JapTracy.
36.

Ibid.

37. Letter from Kenneth Dowie to Commander Riheldaffer dated 28 December 1943 and letter from Dowie to Riheldaffer dated 28 August 1943 Record Group 38, Records of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence,
Special Activities Branch(OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945,
Byron Hot Springs, Letters from April to 6 August 1945, 1
July 1943 to 31 December 1943. See also Burden, 1.
38. Supplement to Report of Iuoue dated 4 October
1943, p. 2, RG 165, Interrogations (Volume 1).
39. Foreign Morale Analysis Division, Bureau of
Overseas Intelligence, Office of War Information: Japanese
Use of American Statements and Acts, Real or Alleged, in
Propaganda to Create Fear (Report #21, 15 June 1945), 4-7;
Principal Findings Regarding Japanese Morale During the War
(Report #26, 20 September 1945), pp. 8-10, Record Group
208, Box 444, quoted in Dower, 68.
40.

Burden, 9.

41.

Ibid, 1.

42.

Ibid., 1.

25

43. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy, Race and Power
in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 37.
44. George Grider, War Fish by George Grider as told
to Lydel Sims (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1958),
357-359.
45.

Dower, 35-36.

46.

Ibid.,

53.

47. Personal interview with R. J. Maness, dated
February 10, 1992.
48. Charles A. Lindbergh,
Charles A. Lindbergh (New York:
Inc., 1970), 880.

The Wartime Journals of
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich

49.

"Battle of the Pacific, "

50.

Burden, 5.

51.

Ibid., 2.

52.

Lindbergh, 902.

Time, 15 March 1943,

20.

53. Personal interview with R. J. Maness, dated
February 10, 1992.
54.

Lindbergh, 915.

55.

Burden, 2.

56. Undated letter from the Secretary of War to the
Secretary of the Navy and letter from the Secretary of War
dated 27 December 1942, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War
Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal
File 1942-1945, 383.6 General P/W, August 1941 to October
1943.
57.
Report of Joint Logistics Committee - Arrange
ments Regarding Prisoners of War Captured in Northwest
Europe, p. 2, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations
Division, Operations Branch, Policy File, 1942-1945,
Population Report to Port of Discharge. See also: Letter
from American Legation, Canberra, to the Secretary of
State, Washington, dated August 21, 1943, Record Group
389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations
Branch, Policy File, 1942-1945, Inspection to South East
Asia Command.

26

58. Letter from the Secretary of War dated 27 Decem
ber 1942, Record Group 407, Army Adjutant General File,
Classified Decimal File, 1940-1942, 383.6, File 1-25-42
(hereafter cited as Secretary of War letter.)
59. Letter to E. Tomlin Bailey, Special War Problems
Division, Department of State, from Brig. General B. M.
Bryan, USA, Assistant to the Provost Marshal General, dated
12 July 1945, Record Group 160, Army Service Forces, Office
of the Commanding General, Control Division, General Corre
spondence File, 1945-1946, 383.6 Japanese (hereafter cited
as Bailey letter to Bryan).
60.

Ibid.

61.

Secretary of War letter.

62.

Bailey letter to Bryan.

63. War Department Memorandum No. W600-58-43 dated 25
July, 1943. Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activi
ties Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy,
California, no file number or name.
64.

Ibid.

65. Personal interview with R. J. Maness dated Febru
ary 14, 1992.
66. Personal interview with Tosh Tanaguchi dated
March 9, 1992; Confidential Memo (WCJ-640) to Commander
John Riheldaffer dated 18 May 1945, Record Group 38, Re
cords of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval
Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records
of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, File #59; and "Frank
lin Damage Put at $45,000,000", New York Times, May 30,
1945, 3.
67.

Primrose letter.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PROCESSING AND DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS

Although the first prisoners who were captured in
World War II caught the U.S. off guard, the Navy quickly
issued clear-cut directives concerning their care.

In

fact, the first letter of instructions on the handling of
prisoners was issued on Decembeir 5, 1941, two days before
Pearl Harbor.

These instructions were accompanied by a 27-

page questionnaire to assist in formal interrogations if
they were ever required.^

A revision, based upon British

Naval policy and updating the procedures, was written May
19, 1942.2
According to these updated instructions, Naval
commanders were to ensure that prisoners were segregated
into three groups immediately as they were received on
board.

These groups were divided into officers, non-com

missioned officers, and enlisted men, and no member of one
group was to be permitted to speak with a member of another
group or with U.S. servicemen, except those specifically
designated as interpreters.

To ensure compliance, and to

convey the urgency of proper procedures, the instructions
described problems occurring during the recent capture of a
27
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submarine crew.

The captain of the submarine was given

permission to speak to his crew and utilized the opportuni
ty to remind his crew to give no information of value to
their captors.

Although the American crew quickly stopped

him when they realized what he was saying, the damage was
already done and his crew remained highly security con
scious, giving very little information of value to their
captors.
After being segregated, the prisoners were to be
searched minutely and everything except necessary clothing
was to be taken from them, made into separate bundles, and
marked clearly with the prisoner's name, rank, and serial
number.

This would give the prisoners extra incentive to

give correct information since the only way they could
retrieve their possessions was to have it marked with the
required information. Receipts would be given "if
demanded."

During the search, the instructions noted,

special care was to be taken to prevent any prisoner from
throwing any articles overboard or otherwise disposing of
them.

Also, seamen were reminded that souvenirs were not

to be taken.

To keep sailors from stealing items of intel

ligence value, the Navy implemented a policy whereby arti
cles received by the Division of Naval Intelligence which
were determined to have no technical or intelligence value
would be returned to the commander of the forces involved
in the capture for distribution.
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Once prisoners had been segregated and completely
searched, they would be fed, given warm clothing and medi
cal attention, and provided with such amenities as ciga
rettes.

The instructions were explicit about this; intel

ligence gathering was more important than the care of the
prisoners and would be accomplished first.
Officers and interpreters were to stay with the pris
oners during mealtimes and periods of exercise and relaxa
tion.

This way, they could listen to the prisoners' con

versations and try to gather information from careless
comments.

If enough men were proficient in the language,

others would be used as guards for the same reason, al
though they were never to reveal their knowledge of the
prisoners' language, since this would have caused the
prisoners to become more security conscious.
The instructions further ordered that "although some
prisoners may be taken who are eager to talk under the
stress and shock of action, capture and possible exposure",
no attempts were to be made at formal interrogation unless
a prisoner was suffering from wounds or exposure to such an
extent that there was doubt that he would survive the trip
O
.
.
.
back.
In these cases, pertinent portions of a question
naire were to be used as a guide to gather information the
prisoner might have possessed.
A roster of prisoners and a statement describing the
action in which they were taken was to be prepared.

Upon
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arrival in port, these documents would be turned over to
the Commandant of the Naval District or his designated
representative, along with the prisoners, their personal
possessions, and any other material gathered in the encoun
ter.

Items of foreign military equipment which were of no

further use to the prisoners was to be taken and turned
over to the quartermaster salvage officer.

Many items,

including helmets, cartridge belts, cartridge pouches,
first aid kits, canteens, and gas masks, were shipped to
one of the Washington Quartermaster Depots and issued to
U.S. troops for training.

Other salvageable items, such as

blankets and shelter halves would be kept as well.^
Once the prisoners were transferred to a Naval prison
camp, they would be assigned a serial number, photographed,
and fingerprinted; and a basic personnel record would be
prepared for them.

Then, as soon as possible, they were

transferred to the custody of the Army for final disposi
tion .
The serial numbers given to the prisoners consisted of
four components.

The first component was the symbol "ISN",

standing for Internment Serial Number.

The second was the

numerical symbol of the naval district in which the prison
er was landed and processed and the third was the number of
the individual prisoner of war.

This number was determined

by counting consecutively, starting with one, the number of
prisoners received and processed in that district since the
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beginning of the war, without regard to the country the
prisoner had served.

The fourth component was the symbol

"Na", which designated that the prisoner had been in custo
dy of the Navy.
received

Thus, the twenty-fifth prisoner of war

and processed at a naval shore station in the

Fourteenth Naval District would be assigned serial number:
"ISN-14-25(Na)", and the twelfth prisoner received and
processed in the Thirteenth Naval District
signed the number:

would be as

"ISN-13-12(Na)".^

The prisoners were photographed in two positions, full
face and profile.

The prisoner's serial number would

appear in both positions.

At least five sets of each

picture were printed so that five copies of the prisoner's
Basic Personnel Record could be created.

The prints could

not be greater than 2" x 2" to accommodate the personnel
record.
Five sets of fingerprints were also required.

This

could either be accomplished by taking one set of original
fingerprints and photocopying the rest or by taking five
sets of original fingerprints, one for each record.
The Basic Personnel Record itself consisted of War
Department - Provost Marshal General's Office Form No. 1,
printed and furnished on heavy paper suitable for permanent
records.

It contained the prisoner's serial number, name,

personal information, the appropriate photographs and
fingerprints, and an inventory of any personal effects
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taken from the prisoner.

Each prisoner would sign the form

after inventorying his personal effects and ensuring each
item was listed on the inventory.
Any "untoward incidents" such as a death or injury of
a prisoner, damage or loss of property of prisoners, es
capes or attempted escapes, or any other incident likely to
result in complaints by prisoners occurring during the
voyage was to be recorded immediately.

The Commanding

Officer of the vessel would then appoint a Board of Inves
tigation consisting of three or more officers, one of whom
would be a medical officer.

This Board was to conduct a

hearing according to the principles of military law, call
ing and examining witnesses, including prisoners of war,
and determine whether any blame was attributable to the
personnel of the United States or to the prisoners of war.
The Board would then make recommendations consistent with
its findings.

If the Board attributed the blame to any

U.S. personnel or prisoner of war who could be punished
adequately by disciplinary action, such punishment was
administered immediately.

If the offense was serious

enough for a court-martial, summaries of evidence were
taken and arrangements were made for essential witnesses to
be present at the trial. f)
Arriving at processing camps like Sand Island, Hawaii
and Angel Island, California, prisoners held by the Navy
were transferred to the Army. The officer in command of the
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naval escort party would carry four copies of each of the
transferred prisoners' Basic Personnel Records with him.
The commanding officer of the Army enclosure to which the
prisoners were being transferred

would check the contents

of the records against the prisoners and, if everything
seemed in order, receipt for each prisoner in the space
provided on the reverse side of each record.

He would also

inventory the prisoner's personal effects, which were
packaged separately, and accept custody of these as well by
initialing the appropriate block.

He would retain three

copies of the records and return the fourth copy to the
commanding officer of the Naval escort party for permanent
retention by the Navy.

This would provide both military

branches with a written record of the transfer.
Conditions in Army field camps were not quite so
organized.

With no firm guidance, commanders were left to

make their own decisions on how to properly detain prison
ers until their transportation to the U.S.
On Guadalcanal, the Japanese were housed in a compound
built on a former Japanese bivouac area.

The prisoners

cooked their own meals, often from food captured from their
comrades in arms, over the same fires and in the same iron
O
pots they had used before their capture.
They were
dressed in clothing captured by U.S. servicemen and identi
fied by tags hung on each by means of a looped cord around
his neck.

These tags had been filled out at the division
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collecting point and listed the date of capture, place of
capture, and the unit that had made the capture as well as
identifying the wearer as a prisoner.

The prisoners were

warned that if the tag were mutilated, destroyed, or lost,
they would be provided with no food, but no documentation
exists as to whether this threat was actually carried out. 9
Most prisoners were guickly shipped to Army processing
camps like Sand Island, Hawaii and Angel Island, Califor
nia.

The camp at Sand Island consisted of several wooden

barracks, only one of which was more than one-story high.
John Rudolph Sulzer noted on his visit that the barracks
were "of excellent construction, well-ventilated, welllighted and having shuttered windows.

Large spaces are

left between the beds and in several of the barracks the
beds are tiered.

He noted that electricity had been

installed in each of the barracks as well.

Since the camp

contained several Japanese, German, Italian, and American
civilians as well as the prisoners, each race was segregat
ed as agreed upon in the Geneva Convention and the prison
ers were divided into officers and enlisted and kept sepa
rated from the civilians as well.
The prisoners prepared their meals in a kitchen pro
vided exclusively for their use and washed their clothes in
a laundry which was placed at their disposal three times a
week.

They shopped at a canteen, in which they could buy

cigarettes, tobacco, magazines, vitamin pills, and phono
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graph records.

The camp was also provided with a library

and an infirmary, which was served by a Japanese doctor who
worked under the surveillance of the camp doctor. Serious
medical cases were taken to the military hospital at Hono
lulu .
Since Sand Island was a transit camp, the prisoners
did not work, although they were paid as required by the
Geneva Convention.

Discipline was maintained by an elected

representative from each barracks.

In his report, Sulzer

noted that the prisoners seemed happy and well cared for.^
The Angel Island processing camp was located on the
northern end of Angel Island, a small mountainous island at
the northern tip of San Francisco Bay.

It had previously

served as a quarantine station for the Immigration Service
and was now part of the military post of Fort McDowell.
Opened the day the U.S. entered the war, it was set up to
receive civilian internees.

However, the internees were

soon transferred and replaced by prisoners of war.

Having

a total capacity of 500, it was composed of a brown twostory building and a smaller building that served as a
kitchen and dining area.

The buildings were surrounded by

a single seven-foot chain-link fence, which was topped by
two feet of barbed wire with no overhang and surrounded on
all sides by trees.

To the north, the fence was within

eight feet of the main building and nowhere was it more
than 75 feet from it.

Two guard towers were located at
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diagonal corners of the prisoner compound and each time the
guard changed a count was made of the prisoners. 12
■

The prisoners slept on steel or iron three-decker cots
and were each issued three blankets. Their meals were a
compromise between American and Japanese food. The cooks
were Japanese and worked under the direction of an American
sergeant.

They were provided with forty pounds of rice for

every hundred people per meal.

The prisoners also ate

great quantities of cabbage, which they liked and believed
was a sort of cure-all.

They did not care for milk, but

drank both coffee and tea.

Before September of 1944, the

prisoners were served rice with every meal, but during an
inspection of the camp by the International Red Cross that
month, they requested that they receive rice only twice a
day and be served bread for the third meal.

Their request

was granted and, after that, they received bread or toast
•
with
breakfast. 1 3

The prisoners received an exacting set of rules that
described their daily schedule and listed required duties
and restrictions (see Appendix 1).
plinary problems.

There were few disci

For recreation, the prisoners engaged in

baseball, volleyball, wrestling, or games of Mah-jongg.
They liked to gamble and often used tobacco as stakes.
They also spent time indoors reading, although there were
no books in Japanese until after September of 1944.

Being

a transient camp, there were no educational services or
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canteen. If the prisoners desired anything normally carried
in a canteen, they would prepare a list and the items were
purchased from the American post exchange.

When the pris

oners received the items, their accounts were debited the
cost of the articles.^
While Sand Island served as just a temporary detain
ment camp, Angel Island, which was the main transit camp on
the west coast of the continental U.S., was more than it
seemed.

In addition to being a temporary detainment camp

and processing center, it also served as a facade for a
nearby interrogation center which was so secret even its
■ •
■
15
name was classified,
Byron Hot Springs.
Once prisoners arrived at the processing camps like
Sand Island, Hawaii and Angel Island, California, Army
procedures became more organized.

Although no one at Angel

Island had prepared a written Standard Operating Procedure
for processing prisoners as of September 29, 1944, a proce
dure had been perfected by trial and error.

Prisoners were

received from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.
Before the prisoners left the ship, Angel Island personnel
obtained a passenger or sailing list and mimeographed
several copies of it.

These copies were furnished to

personnel in the receiving room, the photo lab, the supply
room, and the PW personnel section, as well as to the
billeting non-com, the canteen officer, the medical offi
cer, the sergeant of the guard, and the mess officer.
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Then, as the prisoners left the ship,

they were searched

by the Port Provost Marshal. All of their possessions,
including the articles that were to be confiscated, were
placed with their baggage and tagged, to be delivered
separately from the prisoners themselves.

The prisoners

were directed through a disinfestation plant and
a complete medical exam at this t i m e . E a c h

underwent
prisoner

stripped and took a shower while all of their clothing was
treated with ethyl bromide in a nearby gas chamber.

Fol

lowing this, the escorting officer and the prison officer
conducted a thorough inspection of each prisoner with a
flood light and all of their hairy body parts were sprayed
with an insecticide.

The inspection was to check each

prisoner for body lice, check their throat and teeth for
evidence of infection, their eyes for evidence of trachoma
and conjunctivitis, their skin for evidence of rashes, and
their genitalia and anus for evidence of venereal
disease.

They were then counted and marched to the

processing room with only the clothes on their back.

Here,

personnel records were initiated and serial numbers assigned, if either had not already been accomplished. 1fi The
Army's serial numbers, however, were composed differently
than those of the Navy.
If assigned in the field, the first component of the
serial number consisted of three symbols, a number desig
nating a command within the appropriate theater, a letter
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designating the theater of operations in which the prisoner
was captured, and the first letter of the country in whose
armed forces the prisoner was serving.

The second compo

nent was assigned consecutively, according to the number of
prisoners captured in the command of the appropriate thea
ter regardless of which country he had served.

Thus, the

35th prisoner captured in the Southwest Pacific, if serving
in the Japanese Army, would be assigned 42SJ-35.
Prisoners transferred to the continental U.S. without being
processed in the field were given numbers composed in a
slightly different manner.

Serial numbers assigned at the

Service Command consisted of a number representing the
appropriate Service Command - one through nine, the letter
"W", representing the War Department, the first letter of
the country he had served, and the prisoner number which
was assigned consecutively by the Service Command regard
less of which country he had served or where he had been
captured.

1 Q

If a personnel record had already been completed on a
prisoner, it was checked for

the legibility of the finger

prints and to ensure that there had been no major changes
in the prisoner's appearance.

If the prints were illegible

or if the prisoner's appearance had changed materially, a
notation was made on the record and an appointment set for
a new photo or new set of fingerprints to be taken.

Each

prisoner was given a numbered bottle and instructed how to
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collect a small specimen of his feces.

Direct stool cul

tures were plated and malaria smears made using the number
from the bottle.

The prisoners received immunizations for

typhoid and vaccinations for smallpox.

At this time, all

of the Japanese prisoners chose to sign a statement saying
that they did not want their relatives or their government
informed of their capture.

This was allowed since the

United States wished to abide by the Geneva Convention, but
also wanted to keep the prisoners happy.

Since each pris

oner signed the statement, there was no mail to or from the
prisoners at Angel Island. 2 2
•

The extremely sick and wounded prisoners were taken to
Letterman General Hospital, but "in the interest of effi
ciency and economy of manpower", their non-medical records
were not transferred to that station.

Thus, while the

medical records went to the hospital with the prisoner, all
pay and administrative procedures were still accomplished
by Angel Island personnel.

Only those who were extremely

sick or wounded were transferred, however.

A Red Cross

report from September 16, 1944 showed that of 450 prisoners
remaining at Angel Island, fifty-one had syphilis, twelve
had some kind of skin disease, and twenty-five had war
wounds whose bandages required changing daily.

Several

others had intestinal worms or carried dysentery germs.
The report also suggested that although blood tests had
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shown only a few cases of malaria, there were probably many
other cases that had not shown positive on the test.^
While the prisoners were processed, their baggage was
thoroughly searched.

The prison spokesman, the section

leader of the prisoners whose baggage was being searched,
the receiving and property officer, and an interpreter were
all present during this search.

Articles to be confiscated

were taken at this time and receipts were prepared for any
money or valuables removed from the baggage.

o5

The fact that conditions were more orderly than in the
field did not, however, mean that every detail went accord
ing to plan.

Interrogators in the U.S. often complained

that prisoners they received were "stale" and almost worth
less for interrogation purposes.

Also, in a letter to

Commander Riheldaffer, who worked closely with Byron Hot
Springs, E. J. Allen, a Navy interrogator there, showed
nothing but contempt for the "routine of handling prisoners
in [the] custody of the Army."

He described the routine as

follows:
When the P/Ws were taken from the van which had
transported them from the ship they were herded
into a room preparatory to getting deloused.
There were two young Japanese Nisei to be used
as interpreters; however, they were quite
useless, as they could not talk the language
sufficiently to keep things orderly. The
result was much confusion, with the officers
and Nisei making signs to have the P/Ws get
their clothing off. The captain in charge
assigned six enlisted men to search their
clothing. These men had not previous experi
ence and I could not refrain from making some

42

suggestions which resulted in producing an
array of razor blades, knives, etc., hidden in
the inner soles of the P/Ws' shoes and in the
seams of their hats and trousers.
The entire procedure in my opinion, was
handled very clumsily. Papers and articles
taken from these prisoners were thrown away and
no provision was made to turn them back to the
owners. Goods were thrown in a big pile and
then stuffed into prisoners' bags, regardless
of ownership. b
While not all inprocessing worked in this manner, sometimes
it did occur.

Prisoners were supposed to be in the proc

essing camps only long enough to be processed in and then
moved on to a permanent camp, but sometimes this did not
work according to plan either.

At least on one occasion, a

prxsoner was held at Sand Island for over a year. 27

As

time went on, however, things became better organized and
problems such as these became fewer.
When the prisoners had been completely inprocessed and
interrogated, they were ready to be shipped to their perma
nent camp.

For the Japanese prisoners, from April 1943

until February 1945, this meant Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.
When the majority of the prisoners were ready for depar
ture, the Post Transportation Officer requested a Main
number and routing from Washington, D.C. and made the
necessary accommodations with the railroad for the trip, as
prisoners were not allowed to fly on commercial airlines.
Orders were published and the orders, as well as the rout
ing, time of departure, and estimated time of arrival, were
mailed to the POW Camp involved as well as the Commanding
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Generals of each Service Command involved.
When the train arrived, the cars to be used to trans
port the prisoners were inspected.

If possible, this was

accomplished the day before, but was sometimes done the day
of the trip.

Prison type cars were used, if available, but

if not available, care was taken that cars with blind spots
or compartments were not used.

"Jumpers", cars whose

generators were defective and which used electricity gener
ated by another car by means of heavy electrical cables,
were also rejected.

Fire extinguishers were removed from

each car and the glass cases containing fire fighting
equipment were covered with cardboard.

The door of one

toilet was locked securely and the door to the other was
removed so that the guard inside the car could see all of
the prisoners all of the time.

Windows were blocked so

that they could not be raised more than four inches.
Finally, two coal lamps were suspended from the baggage
racks of each car to be used as auxiliary lighting devices
and a car loading schedule was furnished to the train
commander by the Transportation Officer.

O O

After being informed that they would not be allowed to
reenter the barracks, the prisoners were assembled in the
recreation area, carrying their baggage and memorandum
receipt property, which was the U.S. government property
issued to them for use during their internment. Their
baggage was taken into the searching room and searched and
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the memorandum receipt property was inspected for deliber
ate damage or loss and taken up.

If deliberate damage or

loss was identified, the prisoner was charged for the
property.

The prisoners were then marched through the

Processing Room, where their identification was checked and
a body search made.

They then proceeded to the Searching

Room, picked up their baggage, and marched out of the
enclosure to the train.

The prison officer and the train

commander checked to ensure the proper number of prisoners
as they boarded the train.
Two guards rode in each car with the prisoners.

They

had written orders to command "Halt" and then to fire
immediately on any prisoner attempting escape.

Interpret

ers explained the meaning of "Halt" and communicated all
rules and procedures to the prisoners before the trip
began.

The guards were also to stop the train and call out

the guard during any riot or escape attempt.

Prisoners

were to remain seated when the train was moving, unless
given permission by a guard to leave their seat.

Even

then, only one prisoner could leave his seat at a time.
Prisoners were not to be allowed to use the latrine when
the train was stopped or slowing down to stop, but were
allowed to use them at any other time.
other such noises were forbidden.

Loud singing or

Strict military disci

pline was maintained and prisoners were required to be
courteous and respectful toward U.S. personnel at all
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times.

The train commander was responsible for discipline

and if punishment was ever required for an offense, a
report of the offense and punishment were given to the
internment camp commander along with the prisoner when the
train arrived.

Prisoners were not to be tied or handcuffed

"unless absolutely necessary either for the protection of
the prisoners or to prevent escape."

oQ

They were allowed

to smoke, but since they were not allowed to have matches,
lights had to be furnished by supernumeraries or non-com
missioned officers.

The guards assumed their duties before

the prisoners entered the train and their job was not
finished until they delivered the prisoners, properly
aligned and together, to their relief.

In this manner, the

• permanent camp.30
prisoners were transported to their
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CHAPTER THREE

OUR SECRET INTERROGATION CENTERS

In addition to the processing centers and the perma
nent prisoner of war camps, the U.S. also had two secret
interrogation centers, one at Fort Hunt in Washington, D.C.
and one at Byron Hot Springs, California.

These interroga

tion centers were used to conduct detailed interrogations
of the most knowledgeable of the prisoners brought into the
U.S.

Although interrogations were conducted in the field,

these were primarily to gain tactical knowledge for immedi
ate use on the battlefield.

Early in the war, critical

information of long term strategic value was often lost or
discarded before it reached the strategic planners in the
U.S.

The proposed interrogation centers would help to

correct this situation.^
In early 1942, the Secretaries of the Army and Navy
agreed to establish two interrogation centers, one on the
east coast and one on the west coast. 2
centers

The interrogation

were to be placed under the control of the Provost

Marshal General, but made available to the Military Intel
ligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence for
the interrogation of prisoners.
49

The Chiefs of the Army and
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Navy Interrogation Sections were responsible for providing
the interrogation personnel while the Provost Marshal
General was to designate the commander and provide the
necessary supplies, equipment, and personnel for their
operation.

Later, because of the inefficiency of the dual

system, the system was revised and the senior Military
Intelligence Service Officer was designated as Commanding
Offxcer as well.
The centers were not classified as prisoner of war
camps, but rather "as Temporary Detention Centers for the
specific purpose only of interrogating certain prisoners of
war captured either by the Army or Navy."

The Provost

Marshal General was to be responsible for ensuring that the
provisions of the Geneva Convention were upheld and all
other commanders involved were to ensure that he received
the reports necessary to accomplish his task.^
The initial configuration determined, representatives
of the Office of Naval Intelligence, G-2, and the Provost
Marshal General were sent to locate suitable sites for the
centers.

After looking at several sites, the representa

tives on the east coast recommended Swannanoa, a vast
estate near Staunton, Virginia, and the representatives on
the west coast recommended Byron Hot Springs, a private
health resort near San Francisco.

While Swannanoa was

rejected and the center on the east coast placed at Fort
Hunt, Byron Hot Springs was approved on April 25, 1942.
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Byron Hot Springs was two-hundred and ten acres of
slightly rolling terrain surrounded by a wheat farm.
Entered by way of a private macadam road, it was hidden
from any public roads or nearby houses.

The surrounding

area was almost desolate and the only nearby town contained
only a few dozen people, providing almost complete privacy.
On the grounds were several sulpher springs and a small
group of buildings.

The main building was a four story

brick hotel containing fifty bedrooms, each averaging 11'
by 12' with a private toilet, washbasin, and outside expo
sure, a kitchen, game room, barber shop, two indoor mineral
baths, and several other large rooms.

Surrounding the

hotel were two dorms, each containing a set of showers, a
bathroom and twenty 8' by 10' rooms, several cottages with
between one and eight rooms each as well as a bathroom or
washstand, a nine car automobile shed, two brick bath
houses, an old farmhouse, the owner's home, and several
other miscellaneous sheds and buildings.
Mrs. Reed, the owner of the property, refused to sell
the property as she regarded it as a memorial to her first
husband.

It was he who had seen Indians taking baths in

the sulpher springs on the land in 1868 and decided to
establish a health resort on the area.

However, she was

"willing to give the property to the Army for the duration
of the war and enter into a ninety-nine year lease thereaf
ter with an agreement to leave it to the Army by will upon
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her death." ft

This sounded good to the representatives,

except that Mrs. Reed had already leased the property on a
ninety-nine year term to a retired Navy doctor.

Mrs. Reed

explained that this would be no problem as the doctor was
unable to keep up with the rent and would soon have to give
up the property anyway.

Reports rndrcate that condemna

tion proceedings were instituted and possession of the
property was effective 1 June 1942.

Construction to preo
pare the site for its new task was begun immediately.
Workers built false ceilings to cover a maze of wires that
would be connected to listening devices and false parti
tions to provide listening spaces between the walls of
rooms that would house the prisoners.

Windows of wired

glass construction were installed and barred with heavy
steel.

Locks were put on the doors and a fence erected to
Q
.
surround the area.
Other buildings were turned into

officers' quarters, MP barracks, barracks for MIS interro
gators, a laundry, a guardhouse, a post exchange, and a
myriad of other structures necessary to a military post.^
Construction was completed in December of 1942 and Byron
Hot Springs accepted its first prisoners January 1, 1943.^
This first shipment, containing ten prisoners, was
received directly from Hawaii.

One was an aviator observer

from one of the three planes attached to the battleship
Kirishima.

Two others were from the destroyer Shirakumo

and the final seven were from the cruiser Furutaka, which
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was sunk off of Guadalcanal in October of 1942.

These

prisoners "were exceedingly cooperative and showed little
trace of being security conscious."

However, soon after,

the camp received sixteen new prisoners.

These prisoners

had been captured as far back as February 24, 1942

and

came from the relative ease and comparative freedom of Camp
Livingston.

They included the senior ranking Japanese

prisoner in the United States, Commander Kunizo Aiso of the
Hiryu, and were, in nearly every case, quite careful about
giving any statements helpful to their captors.

The inter

rogators learned from this that prisoners must be interro
gated soon after capture or they would become security
conscious and their information stale and worthless. 13
Because of this, the interrogation centers soon de
veloped a system of screening prisoners while still in the
theater of operations and as they arrived in the U.S.
Particularly knowledgeable prisoners with long term techni
cal or strategic information were to be flown to the U.S.
for interrogation.

"In theory, this procedure was excel

lent, but was restricted in practice, by the claim of the
CSDIC - UK [Combined Services Direct Interrogation Center United Kingdom.] At no time during the operation of the
American section of CSDIC(AFHQ) was an equitable distribu
tion of prisoners of war established."^

Thus, most of

the selection process was accomplished at the U.S. ports of
entry.

While inprocessing at the Angel Island Processing
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Center in California, prisoners were given a "registration
form."

This form asked for the prisoner's "name, rank and

internment serial number, his birthplace, the complete
inscription of his identification tag, his place of residence, civilian occupation, etc." 1R In most cases, the
prisoners did not realize they could not be forced to
answer the questions nor did they understand the reason
behind the questions, so they filled in the requested
information, believing the form was an essential part of
the inprocessing.

However, screening teams, usually made

up of one officer and four Nisei, used the forms to elimi
nate those prisoners least eligible for interrogation,
allowing them more time to further screen more eligible
prisoners.

These prisoners were interrogated briefly

following delousing and other sanitary procedures and
information gathered on their past history, capture, and
previous interrogations.
classified as A, B, or C.

Finally, all prisoners were
Those classified as C were

determined to have no information of value and not consid
ered for interrogation.

They were supposed to be shipped

to Camp Stoneman, another holding area nearby, to keep them
from mingling with the other prisoners, but because of
problems at Stoneman, this was never done until after
February, 1945.^
Prisoners classified as either A or B were selected
because of their knowledge of a particular region,
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technical knowledge, or because of their civilian or mili
tary experience.

They were moved immediately to Byron Hot

Springs by train for further interrogation.

During the

trip, absolute silence was enforced and blinds or curtains
drawn.

18

Upon arrival at Byron Hot Springs, the prisoners were
kept separated and not allowed to communicate with anyone
except their interrogation officer.

This was continued

until their first interrogation was completed, so interro
gations were quickly accomplished.

The interrogation

officer checked the assessment of the first classification
and ensured that his prisoners were placed in the room that
would be most helpful to their captors.
men were assigned to a room.

Normally, two

Their voices or dialects were

to differ enough that unseen listeners could distinguish
between them.

They were to be from different ships or, if

that were not possible, from different branches of the ship
so that they would be unable to fabricate stories to tell
the interrogators.

"Toughs" were separated so they would

not spoil the others and sometimes prisoners who had been
at the camp for a while would be chosen as stool pigeons
and assigned with a new prisoner to get him talking. 2 0
While the prisoners were arriving and room assignments
determined, teams checked the rooms to which they were
assigned to ensure that no messages or warnings had been
left by the former occupant.

These teams were warned to
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check for messages written on walls, pinpricked into wood
work, left in the toilet, rolled into toilet paper or
hidden inside the cardboard centers, or taped beneath the
■
window
ledges.? 1
Once prisoners had been placed in their rooms, one
officer studied the material taken from the prisoners.
Then a meeting of the interrogation officers was held.
Here, the prisoners were discussed and information gathered
from the screening and from the prisoner's personal items
were shared with the group.

Upon the basis of this infor

mation, the prisoners were assigned to the Air Section, the
Geographic Section, the Army Section, etc.

The head of the

section then assigned the prisoner to an individual inter
rogation officer who worked for the section.

Naval prison

ers were first provided to interrogators from the Navy,
then released to the Army for further interrogation or
final processing.

However, when the Army Air Corps discon

tinued its duties in anti-submarine warfare, the Army
relinquished its rights to interrogate Naval prisoners as
well.^
Each individual interrogator gathered all of the
information available on the prisoner he was to interrogate
and studied it for several hours.

He was to try to create

the impression of omniscience and this often required from
three to six hours of preparation for each hour of interro
gation.

Then, working from a daily schedule prepared by

57

the Chief Interrogation Officer, he had the prisoner ordered
into the interrogation room.

99

Normally, the best sub

jects for interrogation were the petty officers, who,
although having considerable knowledge of a technical
nature and some intelligence, were less apt to be as secu
rity conscious as officers.

Therefore, since background

information was extremely useful in gaining further infor
mation, the schedule normally began with the youngest and
most stupid members of the crew, followed by the officers,
the junior ratings in ascending order of intelligence, and,
finally, the Petty officers."^
A guard, "who should be smart, of good build,
salute well, and stand at attention" 9 R would lead the
prisoner into the room, which was designed to create a
formal and serious impression and to make the prisoner illat-ease.

The prisoner was to stand at attention, give the

customary Japanese bow, and then remain standing at atten
tion until the interrogation officer released him from this
formality.

The interrogators were warned not to ease the

formal attitude until they were sure that the prisoner
would not take advantage of the absence of it.

The door to

the room was to be closed immediately and kept closed
throughout the interrogation.

No person, no matter how

high their rank, was to be allowed to interfere with the
proceedings.

This allowed the interrogator to maintain the

position of power in the room.

9
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Each interrogator was provided with a fictitious name
that resembled his own enough to cover in case someone
slipped and called him by his actual name, but which would
protect him from repercussions once a prisoner was free.
He was to show no sign of nervousness or hurriedness and
was to be prepared "to recount imaginary experiences or
•
.
?7
visits to different places" to get the prrsoner
talking.
He was to frequently take brief notes on technical informa
tion or personal names for use during the rest of the
investigation and

to encourage the prisoner to believe

that no other record was being made of the interrogation.

no

The interrogators were each allowed to use their own
particular styles, but they normally began their interroga
tions by asking questions based on information given by the
prisoner on his registration form, like the circumstances
of his capture.

This allowed the interrogators to check

the veracity of what each prisoner said and made the pris.
•
oner realize that his
statements were being
checked.7 9

With this accomplished, the interrogation was normally
broken into six main stages.

The first stage focused on

the prisoner's "general schooling, business, sympathies and
antipathies in regard to politics, economics, and Japanese
social life."

This gave the interrogator an idea of how

freely the prisoner would talk and also allowed him to play
on the prisoner's prejudices in later interrogations.

59

The second stage obtained a broad outline of his
career and, more particularly, his unit's recent movements.
This was used to build a basis for future interrogations by
allowing the prisoner to talk about things he felt were not
of vital importance and to allow the interrogator to fur
ther check the information the prisoner was giving.

If a

prisoner refused to answer a particular question, the
interrogator would not press the point, but return to the
subject at a later time.

However, he would not immediately

move on, but allow the prisoner to be put even more ill-atease by the period of silence.
Later stages discussed places the prisoner had visited
to determine his interests, the amount of time he had spent
in each area, what he had heard about the war in Europe,
Africa, and the Pacific, the importance the Japanese as
signed to each action, and what they were trying to conceal
or minimize.He was then to be pressed for minute details
and the Japanese plan of action as he or his friends understood it.

Although questionnaires were prepared to give

the interrogators a focus for the interrogation, following
the questionnaires to the letter was highly discouraged;
•
*3?
they were meant only as a guide.

Depending on the personality of the prisoner and his
reluctance to speak in the presence of others, monitors
would either come into the room and take notes on the
interrogation or record the interrogation by using a micro
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phone hidden in the room.

When the interrogation was over,

the interrogator would give a signal, normally a light
flash or a buzzer, and a guard would enter the room and
relieve him of the prisoner.

The prisoner was then escort

ed back to his room where his conversation was monitored to
determine his reaction and to hear any information he
discussed with his roommate.

The interrogator would then

draft a report of the interrogation, using the documents he
had studied, notes or recordings made of the interrogation,
any conversation monitored in the prisoner's room, and, if
available, reports from a stool pigeon.

This report was

supposed to give the interrogator's estimate of the
prisoner's personality and reliability, military history
and background, an outline of the topics covered in the
interrogation, specific information, such as proper names
or localities, and technical information learned, special
points of interest for monitors, and suggested lines for
further interrogation.

Once completed, the report was sent

to a special section for evaluation and editing and for
warded to the appropriate authorities."^
Byron Hot Springs personnel also gathered information
in ways other than direct interrogation.

One method used,

mentioned previously, was the technigue of secretly moni
toring the prisoner's rooms.

This method was declared

"Most Secret and not divulged to anyone outside the
Centre."

When the Chief Interrogating Officer and the
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Navy Chief Interrogator made room assignments, they also
selected, with help from the Chief Monitor, which rooms
would be constantly monitored.

Normal monitoring hours ran

from 7:00am to 10:00pm, although special circumstances
sometimes required longer hours.

Three groups of monitors

divided the day into five hour shifts of monitoring, tran
scribing, and off-duty time.

Recordings were made on

either glass-base or fiber-base phonograph records and were
transcribed in the original language, with doubtful words
and missing phrases duly marked.

Once complete, the tran

scription was evaluated, edited, and translated.

Pertinent

material was extracted or combined with other related
material and disseminated to the appropriate authorities.
To keep the process secret, information was "disguised as
to imply that the information was given to interrogators "
•
■
17
and placed under the headrng
"They are Sayrng."
Stool pigeons, or "cooperative guests" were also
utilized.

The prisoners used were to be thoroughly reli

able, good actors, quick-witted, and have a retentive
memory and versatile conversational powers.

They were to

be employed only when necessary in order to avoid detec
tion.

Normally, stool pigeons were placed under the direc

tion of an officer handler and "paid" with extra privileges
or rations or other amenities.

They were fully briefed on

information to be sought and then allowed to use their own
methods to gain it.

A stool pigeon was often placed in the
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same room as the intended subject or in the exercise pen to
become friendly with an obstinate prisoner.

Drawbacks to

this system were that stool pigeons were often sensitive to
any curtailment of their extra privileges and interrogators
with stool pigeons tended to get lazy.

Even so, much

information that could have been gained in no other way was
obtained by the use of stool pigeons. 3o
Some "guests" were even taken into San Francisco for a
ride and dinner.

This provided the prisoners with a chance

to get away from the interrogation center and the interro
gators with an opportunity to extract information from the
prisoner after "their first slight contact with society and
drinks."

A final method used was to take prisoners to

U.S. naval vessels or military installations to allow them
to make comparisons to the Japanese equivalents.^

Both of

these methods were extremely sensitive and only used with
dependable prisoners.
Although most of these techniques were probably ques
tionable, according to the Geneva Convention, the only
direct violation occurring at Byron Hot Springs dealt with
German prisoners and was quickly dealt with by senior
officers.

Five German prisoners under trial for the murder

of another were at Tracy so that the U.S. could obtain
additional information about the murder.

"During the

interrogation it was reported by the prisoners that coer
cive methods were used, viz., long periods standing at
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attention, extra rides in a motor vehicle at night, use
of a gas mask on which an onion had been rubbed, inocula
tions, and other physical discomitures.

^

Colonel Bliss,

the commander, was sent an official request for an investi
gation and immediately directed to find out who was at
fault.

He was further directed to determine if those at

fault would accept a reprimand from the branch commander in
order to keep the situation from becoming an international
incident.^
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chapter

four

THE PERMANENT CAMPS
As prisoners began to arrive in the U.S., officials
quickly shuttled them to former Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC) camps and civilian internment centers.

These camps

could not be located within fifty miles of the U.S.-Canadi
an border, the Atlantic or Pacific coasts, ordnance depots,
or manufacturing plants handling high explosives.

They

were not to be within thirty miles of the Great Lakes,
twenty miles of certain listed industrial installations, or
within a Vital Air Defense Zone.

Additional regulations

required the camps not be built in a number of large cities
and, in a few cases, entire states.^

Separate camps were

to be provided for each major nationality of the Axis
powers, with the Germans being separated further into antiNazi Army prisoners, other Army prisoners, anti-Nazi Naval
prisoners, and other Naval prisoners.
While later in the war, standard operating procedures
were set up for every detail of the prisoners' capture,
transfer, and internment, the first enemy prisoners caught
the U.S. totally off guard.

Kazuo Sakamaki, the first U.S.

prisoner captured in World War II, was captured December 8,
1941, the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
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The commander of one of five midget submarines involved in
the attack, Sakamaki found that his submarine's gyrocompass
would not work.

He was unable to enter the harbor and

encountered some U.S. destroyers.
his vessel further.

This encounter damaged

Finally, when the damaged vessel

became stranded on a coral reef, he and his crew partner
attempted to scuttle it and began swimming toward what they
thought was Lanai, their planned rendezvous point with the
mother submarine.

Sakamaki passed out in the cold water

and regained consciousness only to find Lieutenant P.G.
Plybon and Corporal David Akui aiming their loaded weapons
at him.

The two, along with a jeep-load of other American

GI's had been sent to investigate the report of
"something . . . amiss offshore" and had found Sakamaki
lying on the beach. Sakamaki, clad only in loin-cloth type
undershorts, was quickly taken to Bellows Field and then to
Sand Island, where he was interrogated and given a complete
medical examination.

Eight weeks later, in late February,

he was transferred to the continental U.S. in a locked and
guarded room

on the internment ship Etlon.

He stayed at

the newly constructed interrogation center on Angel Island,
California for one week and was then transferred to Camp
McCoy, a German and Japanese internment camp in Wisconsin.
His first day there, March 9, 1942, Sakamaki was allowed to
mingle freely with the civilian internees from Japan.
However, the next day he was removed to his own camp.
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Since the Geneva convention required that captured officers
be provided an aide and the U.S. had no Japanese enlisted
prisoners to serve in this capacity, a German internee
offered to serve.

Feeling the shame of being a prisoner,

Sakamaki refused the aide, but did, however, ask for, and
was provided with, a pencil, pencil sharpener, notebook,
library books, and a daily newspaper.
Three months later, Sakamaki was transferred again.
This time, he was sent to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, another
internment camp, along with 250 civilian internees from
Japan.

There he attended classes provided for the intern

ees on English, geography, agriculture, Buddhism, and
theology.

Sakamaki was still the only military prisoner

held captive in the U.S.

The civilian internees in the

camp were soon repatriated to Japan and on June 30, 1942,
Sakamaki was transferred a third time, this time to Camp
Livingston, an internment camp in Louisiana.

However,

Sakamaki was no longer the only military prisoner in the
U.S.

On June 22, nine other Japanese prisoners had arrived

and by July 1, thirty-two German prisoners had arrived as
well.

By October 1, thirty-seven other Japanese prisoners

had been transferred to the U.S. and on October 29, three
Japanese officers, one Warrant officer, and thirty-eight
enlisted men who had been captured during the battles at
Wake Island and Midway, in the Aleutian campaign, and from
miscellaneous patrol boats joined Sakamaki in Livingston.^
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Thus for a while, Sakamaki and his fellow prisoners were
scattered among several camps, usually sharing their accom
odations with Japanese-American internees and foreign
nationals.

However, in April, 1943, the U.S. was better

prepared to hold its new prisoners, so military authorities
decided to house the Japanese prisoners at Camp McCoy,
Wisconsin.

Camp McCoy had previously been limited to a

capacity of one hundred prisoners, as it was the training
center for the 100th Infantry Battalion, a Japanese-Ameri
can unit and the military did not feel safe placing large
numbers of prisoners near the unit.

However, when the unit

was transferred to Europe, the Provost Marshal General
decided to move all of the Japanese prisoners currently in
the U.S. to the camp, to "allocate any additional Japanese
prisoners of war who may be received to [the] camp
and . . . [to] designate it for the permanent internment of
C
all prisoners of war of that nationality." T h u s , on May 11,
1943, Sakamaki and the other 61 Japanese prisoners were
sent to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where the Japanese prisoners
were to be confined for much of the rest of the war.

The

camp held Japanese internees, German prisoners, and had
once even held the 100th Battalion, an Army unit made up of
Japanese-Americans, but it was also now prepared to hold
the Japanese prisoners.^

The camp was also opened up to

its full capability of 1000 prisoners, even though there
were only 62 Japanese prisoners in the continental U.S.
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The interned enemy aliens held at the camp were returned to
the custody of the Department of Justice and then trans.

.

.

ferred out, leaving the entire camp for prisoners of war.

7

The prisoner of war compound at McCoy was situated
about four miles from the Army's temporary training camp of
the same name and about five miles from the town of Sparta.
The surrounding area was relatively sparsely settled,
although the main line of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul,
and Pacific Railroad and a branch line of the Chicago and
Northwestern Railway met at the training camp. 8
The prison camp consisted of four 480 foot by 190 foot
compounds situated around a 216,562 square foot recreation
al quadrangle.

The Japanese were held in two compounds,

and a group of five hundred Germans, who were brought to
the camp December 20, 1943, and comprised the largest pro
portion of the prisoners at the time, were held in the
other two.

Later, the Germans were moved into a newly

built fifth compound and Korean prisoners were brought into
the camp.
Running throughout the camp were graded, but unsur
faced, roads.

The camp also contained a ten bed hospital

and sick call was held daily.

A camp Medical officer and

Dental officer were provided, although the medical services
of the nearby post and two large wards of its hospital were
available for any serious problems.

The entire stockade

was surrounded by a double cyclone wire fence with seven

73

guard towers.

The outer fence was topped with three

strands of barbed wire and the inner twelve-foot fence
with twelve strands.

There was a twenty foot wide "skinned

space" between the two and a military vehicle was driven
through this space frequently during the day.

Each tower

was equipped with its own generator in case of emergency
and was manned by a single guard, who was connected to the
guard house by both a telephone and a two-way walkie
talkie.

The camp was first guarded by members of the 667th

Military Police Escort Guard company, but they were later
replaced by the 1620th Military Police unit.^
The enlisted prisoners were housed in former CCC
barracks, built in 1935 and used from March 1942 until the
arrival of the Japanese prisoners to hold civilian intern
ees.

Each barracks measured 130 foot by 20 foot and held

up to fifty men.

Every man was assigned a bunk bed, spaced

in accordance with current Army regulations, as well as a
small space for clothing and personal effects.

This latter

space was smaller than normal U.S. military standards due
to the small size of the buildings. Wood burning stoves
were used to heat the barracks.

A special barracks was

built for the Japanese officers, with several private rooms
and a living room as well as showers, basins, and toilets.
This barracks was also provided with furniture made by the
prisoners.^^
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Each compound also contained a mess hall, which con
tained separate dining halls for the officers and enlisted
men and was similar in size to the barracks, and a dayroom, made from an extra barracks and stocked with furni
ture and games.
bathhouses.

The prisoners were also provided with

Each was equipped with wash troughs, hot and

cold running water, twelve laundry tubs, and a large wooden
tub constructed by the prisoners, as they preferred tub
baths to showers. 12
McCoy remained the only prisoner of war camp for the
Japanese until late January of 1945, when a flood of pris
oners overwhelmed the capacity of the camp.

At that time,

military officials deactivated the German prisoner of war
camp at Camp Clarinda, Iowa, and reconstituted it as a
Japanese camp.

German prisoners from the camp were care

fully screened and 208 from the group of over 1600 were
retained to do skilled maintenance work around the camp.
The others were transferred to Camp Algonia, another German
camp rn Iowa. 13
The camp at Clarinda was located about one mile south
of Clarinda, Iowa, a small town of about 5000.

It consist

ed of three separate prisoner compounds and a recreational
area, with a separate camp capable of accommodating thirtytwo officers nearby.

The camp itself covered about 116

acres, although the entire reservation used around 285.^
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Each compound contained twenty 20 foot by 100 foot
barracks, similar to the other military barracks of the
time:, four 20 foot by 140 foot mess halls, four latrines,
four orderly rooms, a canteen, an infirmary, and a T-shaped
guardhouse.

At first, while the number of prisoners re

mained relatively small, officials kept all of the Japanese
prisoners in Compound Number 3.-*-“’ Later, as their numbers
increased, they were moved into other compounds as well.
The camps at McCoy and Clarinda remained the primary
prisoner of war camps for the Japanese throughout the war.
Except for a few medical facilities; processing and inter
rogation centers; and "reeducation" camps, which were set
up in Texas near the end of the war, these camps held every
1f
Japanese prisoner in the United States.
Upon arrival at their permanent camp, the prisoners
were to be "assigned to companies of approximately 250
prisoners each," although at first there were not that many
Japanese prisoners in the United States.

Not much effort

was made to establish disciplinary measures before August,
1943,

as the few prisoners interned in the U.S. caused

very few discipline problems.

However, as a large number

of prisoners arrived during the summer months, the WarDepartment adopted a policy that made the prisoners "sub
ject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the
Army of the United States including the Articles of
War . . . .

[and] the civil laws of the United States and
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of the state and municipality where interned.”17

They

were also subject to any rules that the commander deemed
necessary to maintain control of the camp, although these
rules had to comply with Army regulations and the Geneva
convention and were to be posted prominently around the
camp in the prisoners' native language.

They were not,

however, required to obey any laws, regulations, or orders
of the country in whose military they were serving, except
as they were also found in U.S. Army regulations. 18
At the same time, the commander could only admonish,
reprimand, or withhold privileges from any prisoner, or
restrict an officer, who failed to work or comply with
regulations.

These were mostly useless gestures, as the

prisoners had few privileges and were not concerned with
admonishments or reprimands from their enemy.

For more

serious offenses, the prisoners were subject to courtsmartial, except as prescribed by law, international agree
ment, or the War Department, and, except for officer pris
oners, summary punishment by U.S. officers.

If court-

martialing a prisoner, however, the commander was required
to give three weeks notice to the protecting power, which
■ 19
in the case of the Japanese prisoners was Spain.
Military personnel were to be firm and exact in en
forcing military discipline.

Prisoners were not to be

subjected to cruel or unusual punishment or to be subjected
to group punishment for the misconduct of an individual.
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Neither were they to be deprived of their rank.

No prison

er was allowed to discipline another prisoner and fraterni
zation between American personnel and prisoners was not
allowed.
The Army soon realized that the only effective disci
plinary measures involved a prisoner's food and pay, so
restrictions on diet and pay were instituted as punishment
for prisoners.

Section V of Army Regulation 600-375 al

lowed commanders to restrict a prisoner's diet in addition
to confining him in the guardhouse.

The prisoner was to be

provided with a minimum of eighteen ounces of bread a day
and as much water as he desired.

However, there were many

limitations on this type of punishment.

It could not be

imposed continuously for more than fourteen days and was
not to be repeated until a second fourteen days had passed.
In addition, no prisoner was allowed to be put on the
restricted diet for more than eighty-four days in a year
and a doctor had to certify that his health could stand the
diet.^ ■*"
It also led to the policy of "administrative
pressure."

Under administrative pressure, a prisoner who

refused to obey a lawful order or regulation could lose
certain privileges or be placed on a restricted diet.

This

was not a form of punishment, but rather an inducement to
the prisoner to obey a lawful order, as the prisoner could
terminate the pressure at any time by obeying the order.
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The restricted diet or loss of privileges was not limited
to a definite period of time, but could extend until the
prisoner conformed to his captors' desires, as long as
medical inspections warranted the continuation.

Thus, if

the prisoner's health required that he be removed from the
restricted diet, he could be given a meal or a day's ra
tions or more until his health was better and then placed
back on the restricted diet.
Camp commanders could also withhold a prisoner's pay
and allowances with "administrative pressure".

Any money

owed to the prisoner for work completed or for his monthly
stipend could be withheld in the same way as rations.
However, one dollar a month was to be given the prisoner,
even under administrative pressure, to allow him to pur• neccessxties.
• • ?9
chase certarn
The prisoners continued to wear the uniform they were
captured in, unless circumstances or climate dictated
otherwise, until it became unfit for use.

At that time,

they would be issued a new one by the processing station or
prisoner of war camp.

These were supplied from obsolete

stock; any CCC stock, except for spruce green clothing;
class "B" stock; and new stock, in that order.

New stock

would only be used in emergency cases, however.

Some of

the items available for issue included cotton trousers, a
wool shirt and coat, underwear, socks, shoes, boots, a
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belt, gloves, a raincoat, and sanitary items.

Shorts were

not allowed unless the prisoner was engaging in sports or
directed by American medical authorities to sunbathe.
Except for the prisoner's national uniform and the
uniforms of the officer prisoners, all outer garments were
marked in white paint with the letters "PW" or the
prisoner's internment serial number.

Black indelible ink

was used for white or light colored clothing and orange
paint for certain other clothing.

Six inch stencils were

used to mark the back of shirts, coats, blouses, and jack
ets and four inch stencils were used on the backs of the
prisoners sleeves, between the elbow and the shoulder, and
on the pants, immediately above the knee on the front and
immediately below the belt in the back.

Officer prisoners

were permitted to alter their uniforms in order to distin
guish them from the enlisted prisoners, but other than
that, the prisoners were not allowed to alter their uni
forms in any way.

Insignia, which designated the

prisoner's rank, and decorations could be worn, however.
If caught altering their uniforms, the prisoners would have
to return them to their original condition.

If this could

not be done, the uniform would be replaced and the prisoner
charged for the replacement costs.

This became an issue at

McCoy, where the Japanese sometimes cut their shoes into
thongs during the summer.

Hair and grooming standards for
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the prisoners were the same as those of the U.S.
mrlrtary.
In addition to their uniforms, the prisoners were also
issued various sanitary articles, including razor blades,
shaving brushes and creams, toothbrushes and toothpaste,
combs, handkerchiefs, shoelaces, shoe polish, soap, towels,
and needles and thread for sewing.

Each prisoner could

recieve up to one dollar's worth of these supplies each
month, as needed.^
Food was provided for the prisoners by each camp.
Although the nutritional value of the food issued to the
prisoners was required by the Geneva convention to be of
the same quality and quantity as that of the food given to
U.S. troops, the food itself was not required to be of the
same quality and quantity.

In fact, on February 24, 1945

the Provost Marshal General ordered that "immediate
steps . . . be taken to ensure that rations furnished
Japanese prisoners of war do not exceed minimum require.
?R
merits of the Geneva Convention."
The prisoners still
received wholesome food, but prime cuts of meat were re
placed with poorer cuts and non-rationed foods replaced
similar items that were rationed.
In September of 1943, the Office of the Provost Mar
shal General prepared a "Japanese Menu" which listed pro
posed menus to be provided the prisoners for every day of
the month along with the lists of supplies required to
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prepare the menu listings.

These menus were only prepared

as guides, however, since the Prisoner of War Circular No.
1, put out the very same month, allowed rations to be
altered "to suit the needs of the various national groups"
as long as the monetary value of the replacements did not
exceed that of the original rations and no food was
wasted. °

This satisfied the Japanese, whose drgestrve

systems were not used to American foods, and helped to
prevent waste.

It also allowed the guards to ensure the

rations did not spoil.

The average value of the rations

at Camp McCoy during February 1944 was 58.68 cents a day
per prisoner, but by March 1945 the prisoners were "being
fed principally rice, dried fish, and pickle."
year, however, the rations were increased again.

Later that
28

The prisoners were also encouraged to grow gardens.
When the War Department determined that the cultivation
increased the value of the land, the prisoners were even
paid for this labor.

The food grown in these gardens was

used for the prisoners' food and the Quartermaster rations
were decreased accordingly.

This ensured the prisoners

fresh vegetables and helped lower costs for the Army. 29
The medical and dental treatment given the prisoners
was also required to be identical with that of U.S. troops
Upon arrival at their permanent camp, they were given a
physical examination and "at Least once a month thereafter
they [were] inspected by a medical officer for the purpose
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of detecting communicable diseases and vermin infesta
on
. . .
tion."
Medical records were updated and immunizations
and special lab tests or examinations were made as re
quired.
To alleviate the domestic labor shortage caused by the
war and to keep the prisoners busy, the U.S. employed its
prisoners in several areas.

O 1

The Geneva Convention

allowed this as long as the labor did not directly relate
to the war effort and did not jeopardize the health or
safety of the prisoners.
the work

It also implied, however, that

could not be degrading.

O O

Prisoners below the

rank of sergeant could be used to perform general labor,
while non-commissioned officers were to serve primarily as
supervisors, and officers could not be made to work at
all.

However, this left several ideas on exactly which

jobs the prisoners could perform.
Thus, in September, 1943, the War Department clarified
its policies on prisoner employment.

In order to comply

with the requirement against work related to the war ef
fort, prisoners were not to "handle or work on explosives,
ammunition, aircraft, tanks, or other lethal weapons of
war, nor could they handle any supplies destined for
'combat units' ".34

However, combat units were very nsLr-

rowly defined as "units actually engaged or about to engage, m•

.
•
operations
against
the enemy." 15
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Dangerous or unhealthful work was defined by "(l)the
inherent nature of the job; (2)the particular conditions
under which the job was to be performed; and (3)the individual capacity of the prisoner of war."JD

Things such as

the "proper safety devices, the training and experience of
the PW, and the particular task involved, rather than the
overall complexion of the industry, were also
considered."

American officers at the using levels were

to make the final determination, although the prisoner
could appeal to the Protecting Power or the Provost Marshal
General.
Degrading work was at first defined simply as working
as orderlies for other than their own officers, but was
later defined more broadly to include work in civilian
prisons, bartending for officer's clubs, entertaining U.S.
military or civilian personnel, or working as pinboys at
7o
bowling alleys.
In December, 1943, the War Department established a
Prisoner of War Employment Reviewing Board to make the
final decision on any doubtful employment practice.

This

group determined that maintenance, repair work, or parts
salvage on any vehicles designed to hold people or cargo
rather than combat weapons, "scraping operations" on any
military vehicle, or work on gas masks or connected with
the shipment of hydrogen-filled cylinders was permissable,
but preparing vehicles for overseas shipments, steam clean
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ing tanks, or work connected with guns, rifle ranges,
bayonet courses, or any other aids used to train personnel
• combat weapons was not. 39
in
POW labor was divided into several classes and sub
groups.

All work connected with the administration, man

agement and maintenance of prisoner of war camps was Class
1 and all other types of work were Class 2.

Class 1 labor

was primarily for the benefit of the prisoners and included
maintenance and repair of the POW compounds, labor incident
to the comfort or health of the prisoners, and work con
nected "with the interior economy of their companies."^0
Essential labor connected with U.S. military installations
was further labeled Priority I, labor contracted out to
civilian employers was labeled Priority II, and non-essen
tial work on military reservations was labeled Priority
III.41
The War Department did not allow the Japanese prison
ers to perform Priority II labor for much of the war be
cause of anti-Japanese sentiment among the civilian popu
lace.

In April 1943, three Japanese-American farm boys

were released from a civilian internment camp on the west
coast by the War Relocation Board to help the residents of
Marengo, Illinois, who were struggling with labor short
ages.

The boys "were marched back to the train station by

an angry mob led by the mayor, the president of the Park
Board, and the commander of the local post of the American
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L e g i o n . T h i s happened even though the boys were Ameri
can citizens, so after hearing about it, the War Department
refused to put any Japanese prisoners in a similar situa
tion, or worse, and only allowed them to work for the CJ.S.
government itself.
The prisoners at McCoy and Clarinda repaired and
maintained automotive equipment, handled freight in ware
houses, cleared forests and underbrush, cut wood, dug
ditches, repaired roads, cooked, worked in the laundry,
accomplished demolition and construction work, and even
worked on gas masks.^

The prisoners worked best when

commanded by their own supervisors, when working in a
group, and when given a ten minute rest period in the
middle of the morning and afternoon.

"As a whole, the

Japanese were anxious to make a good impression, but became
sullen when urged on or hurried in their work.
When working outside of the camp, the prisoners worked
in groups of up to one hundred and four.
by two MP's and two dog handlers.

They were guarded

Every three weeks, the

dog handlers put on a demonstration for the prisoners,
which served as both entertainment and a helpful reminder
of the dogs' abilities.

The dogs were therefore well

respected by the prisoners and this allowed the use of so
few guards.

If the worksite was nearby, the Japanese NCO's

would march the other prisoners to the site, but if the
distance was longer, the military would truck them.

In
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this manner, the prisoners tore down the CCC camp at Tomah,
Wisconsin, a nearby town, in order to build a hospital in
its place.^

For lunch, the prisoners on these work de-

tails would bring a sandwich or donut from breakfast. A
While the prisoners were required to work, many were
compensated for their labor.

Pay was given in canteen

coupons so that there would be no opportunity to bribe
guards or use money in an escape attempt.

Each enlisted

prisoner was given ten cents a day, which the War Depart
ment averaged out to three dollars a month for expediency,
but laborers were rewarded with up to eighty cents a day
more, based on the amount of work accomplished.

This

amount may seem paltry by today's standards, but was based
loosely upon the twenty-one dollars a month (70 cents a
day) salary paid to American privates in 1941 and would buy
the prisoner eight packs of cigarettes or eight bottles of
beer.

In fact, prisoners at McCoy averaged nineteen dol

lars for the month of February, 1944, which is very close
to that amount.

Even when Germany admitted it could not

pay the same amount and Italy and Japan failed to respond
to the U.S. proposal to do so, the United States continued
to pay its prisoners in this manner.

In case of escape,

however, the prisoner lost his allowance for any time that
he was not in U.S. custody. ^
The Army quickly realized a major deficiency in its
plan.

Not all prisoner labor was as efficient as free
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labor.

To alleviate this situation and to provide an

incentive for prisoners to work harder, the War Department
developed a system of incentive pay.

This system was used

with piecework "to reward hard workers; to penalize lag
gards; and to encourage a greater degree of teamwork among
prisoner laborers."^®

U.S. supervisors determined how much

work the average free worker would be able to complete in a
normal day.

The prisoners were then paid, up to $1.20 a

day, for the percentage of work they accomplished.

If a

worker could complete 10 units of work a day, then the
prisoner was paid eight cents a unit.

This meant that he

would be paid 96 cents if he completed twelve units, but
only 64 cents if he completed only eight.

To encourage

teamwork, the workers were divided into small groups of
twenty-five or less and each group member was paid an equal
share of the total earnings of the group.
Another system used to achieve greater production was
the task system.

Each prisoner or group of prisoners

working under this system would be assigned a definite
amount of work to be completed.

They were informed of the

amount of work to be completed and any action that would be
taken for fast or slow work.

Prisoners would continue to

work until the assigned amount was completed.

This meant

that slow workers would spend more of their day working
while fast workers would go home earlier.

Normally, disci

plinary action was also taken for habitually slow workers.
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A "reasonable" amount of work was usually given, but by the
end of the war, the prisoners were required to work at
least nine hour days to complete their tasks, even if they
were working quickly. ^
Not all prisoners were paid for their labor, though.
The War Department planned for Class 1 labor, work per
formed for the benefit of the prisoners, whether inside or
outside the camp, to be unpaid labor.

However, in prac

tice, this work was divided into paid and unpaid labor.
The War Department realized that the prisoners' morale
would drop, and with it their efficiency, if they were not
allowed an equal opportunity to work for pay, so "it ruled
that neccessary work within the camp which excluded the
PW's from other renumerative labor would be classified as
paid labor.
By January 1944, any labor associated with the
management of POW camps that required special training or
experience, employed prisoners full-time, and was restrict
ed to a certain number of workers was classified as paid
labor.

It included cooks, interpreters, company leaders,

clerks, typists, bookkeepers, stenographers, accountants,
warehouse supply clerks, warehousemen, carpenters, plumbers
electricians, and mechanics.
Certain housekeeping jobs, however, "which represented
only irregular or occasional work were cited as typical
unpaid labor.

Clerks, cook's helpers, tailors, cobblers,
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and barbers were among those l i s t e d . O t h e r jobs, which
needed to be done, but were not paid labor, including the
policing of the camp and maintaining and repairing the
barracks, walks, sewers, and fences of the camp, were
accomplished by daily fatigue details.

These details were

assigned to the prisoners by the camp commander and paid
the standard eighty cents in canteen coupons, which were
contributed by prisoners assigned to paid work.

In this

way, an equitable distribution of paid labor was main.
R9
tamed.

If a prisoner performing paid labor sustained an
injury on the job which prevented him from working for pay
and the injury was not caused by willful misconduct, the
intention to harm or kill himself or another, or by volun
tary intoxication, he would normally be paid forty cents a
day, following the first three days of the injury and not
including Sundays, until he was again able to work, repa,

,

trrated, or died.

C O

The attending medical officer would determine the
ability of prisoners to work and classified them in one of
three catagories:
work.

heavy work, light work, or sick - no

A list of the prisoners showing their individual

labor status was posted on each prisoner company headquar
ters from time to time.^
Some prisoners also worked as unpaid volunteers.

They

engaged in teaching part-time, entertaining, jobs "connect
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ed with recreational or welfare projects," building furni
ture for their recreation rooms, building or decorating
chapels, tending athletic fields, or planting flower gardens around the camps.
By 1944, non-commissioned officers were allowed to
volunteer for work they would not normally do.

While they

normally worked as supervisors, some NCO's volunteered for
non-supervisory duties in areas in which they had special
skills or aptitudes.

At first, these duties were to last

only between thirty and ninety days, but by 1945, they were
allowed to volunteer for any job for the duration of their
■ •
5fi
captivity.

Officers, who could not be forced to work, volunteered
for paid labor as well.

They worked as spokesmen, leaders,

and at other sub-administrative work and were paid the same
eighty cents a day as the enlisted prisoners, although they
received special pay as officers as well (see appendix

2

).

If there were no commissioned officers in the camp, the
prisoners elected a spokesman, who was approved by the camp
commander.

In camps with officers, however,

the senior

officer prisoner in the highest grade served in this posi
tion, unless he was mentally or physically incapacitated or
incompetent.

Some officers accepted the positions, but

• •
refused the additional
pay.S 7

In addition to their own rooms, special pay, and the
opportunity to choose not to work, officers were given
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another privilege by the Geneva Convention - orderlies.
These prisoners performed the duties of normal orderlies
and were often paid by the officers for whom they worked.
One was assigned to each general, one to every six field
grade officers, and one to every twelve company grade
officers.

Only prisoners who could not perform a full
CO
day's work were assigned to the job. ° There were nega
tives to an officer's life as well, however.

Officer

prisoners were required to pay for their meals, which
averaged around seventeen dollars a month, and for their
. R9
clothing.
With the money they received for their labor, the
prisoners were able to purchase tobacco, cheap candies,
toiletries, food, and other supplies from the camp canteen.
At McCoy, the canteen was near the entrance to the gate and
was shared by all nationalities.

It was run by prisoners,

who worked on a contract basis and were paid by profits,
and supervised by an American officer who was appointed to
the job by the camp commander.

Anything that the prisoners

wanted, as long as it was approved by the camp commander,
could be obtained from the canteen.

This included beer and

light wines with no more than a 3.2% alcohol content.
However, no prisoner was allowed to buy more than one quart
in a twenty-four hour period or possess more than a certain
amount at one time.

The profits made by the canteen were
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placed into a special POW fund and used for the benefit of
all of the prisoners at the camp.^
Prisoners were given a twenty four hour rest period
once a week, normally on Sundays.

They were also free

during the evenings after all of their work was accom
plished.

During this free time, prisoners were allowed

to engage in various recreational activities.

At both

McCoy and Clarinda, prisoners soon formed theatrical
troupes and orchestras.

Inspection reports describe

various plays written and performed by the prisoners, with
background music provided by their orchestra and elaborate
sets and costumes created by artists within the camp and
monthly concerts performed by the orchestras. ft 9

Prisoners

learned to ice skate, played baseball, ping-pong, tennis,
and card games, listened to records, and watched weekly
movies provided for them by the camp authorities.

They

cared for rare tropical birds provided by the camp commander

and spent time reading books from the camp libraries,

which grew to well over six hundred volumes in Japanese in
addition to the English books /

’4

They also used this time

to make toys and paper flowers out of cigarette paper and
rice water, build furniture for their barracks and recrea
tion rooms, paint, write poetry, and develop spiritually.
They were allowed visitors twice a month, but it is not
known whether the Japanese took advantage of this opportunity.65

Only a few chose to become Christians during their
captivity, but many were involved in Buddhist and Shinto
services and participated in individual daily spiritual
rituals each morning.

They "fixed up a Japanese

chapel . . . [with] a sanctuary and an alter with carved
idols and artificial flowers made by the prisoners.
Schools were also set up at the camps.

Although well-

developed programs took a while to develop, adhoc classes
in English and several other subjects started quickly.

By

January 1944, Japanese prisoners at McCoy had classes in
English and Japanese writing, and lectures on general
culture, ethics, and history.

Thirteen months later, a

full time school had been established.

In it, thirty-two

high school students learned English, Japanese, geography,
arithmetic, moral science, Japanese history, ancient Japa
nese literature, and water color painting.

Forty percent

of the older prisoners were also receiving instruction in
these and other subjects, including American history,
religion, and physical training.

All of the instructors at

the camp had been professional teachers in civilian life
ZT O

and were paid for their duties from the PW fund.

Mili

tary regulations also allowed prisoners to receive degrees
from several prestigious universities and colleges, al
though no records state that the Japanese took advantage of
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Once they had been assigned to a permanent camp,
prisoners left in only one of three ways:
or repatriation.

transfer, death,

With only the two main Japanese camps,

the Army transferred its Japanese prisoners very infre
quently.

Camp McCoy transferred almost all of its officers

and non-commissioned officers after a riot occurred, but
all other transfers were accomplished on a case by case
basis and usually involved prisoners who needed to be
reinterrogated or assigned to a special "reeducation"
project (see Chapter 5).
Death was not a major factor of prison camp life,
either.

"Of the 5,424 prisoners in the United States, only

twenty-four died while in captivity.

Two apparently killed

themselves [one accidental], three were shot during an
escape attempt [which could probably be better described as
a suicide attempt, since the prisoners had attempted sui
cide before]. . ., one died in an agricultural accident,
and the remaining eighteen succombed to earlier wounds or
natural causes."^

However, the Army had quickly developed

a policy for even this.
Upon the death of a prisoner, the camp commander or
officer charged with the prisoner's custody prior to death
would be immediately notified.

He would then report the

death to the Provost Marshal General, giving the prisoner's
full name, internment serial number, place and cause of
death, and note if the prisoner's death resulted from his
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own misconduct.

If the death was the result of an escape

attempt, foul play or suspected foul play, violence, or
other unnatural cause, including suicide, or if the cause
was unknown, a summary court was appointed to investigate
and was to report its findings directly to the Provost
Marshal General.
The dead prisoner was given a funeral with full mili
tary honors.

The flag of the country in whose army the

prisoner had served would be draped over the casket.

Also,

if requested by the other prisoners, taps would be played
and a salute fired by base personnel.

Although military

regulations allowed a burial in the nearest available
permanent cemetery, most Japanese prisoners were
cremated.7 1
This left the majority of: the prisoners in their
permanent camp until the war's end.

Finally, on 7 Septem

ber, 1945, officials at Camp McCoy and Camp Clarinda were
ordered to transfer all Japanese prisoners of Okinawan
origin to Angel Island.

A month later, on October 5, they

were to have transferred all of their other Japanese pris
oners to the west coast for repatriation as well.

This

included 987 Japanese prisoners from Camp Clarinda and
2,550 Japanese, 144 Koreans, and 3 Formosans from McCoy.
Thus, within one month of the end of the war the prisoners
began to be repatriated.

They were first sent to clusters

of holding camps near San Francisco and Los Angeles.

Here
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they waited for ships to continue their journey.

For a

while, life remained much the same as it had been in the
permanent camps.

However, as ships began to arrive, each

prisoner "was fingerprinted once again, his records updat
ed, and his belongings searched for 'contraband' or money
in excess of the 500 yen ($125) or 200 yen ($50) which the
officers or enlisted men respectively were allowed to bring
• journey
•
back to Japan" in preparation for his
home. 77
On November 13, 1945, 672 Japanese prisoners were
transferred to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation from
Angel Island and the camp commander requested the camp be
closed.

By the end of December, 1,120 prisoners, including

675 who were sick or badly wounded, had been shipped back
to Japan from the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, not
including the numbers shipped from the other ports.

Of the

5,413 Japanese prisoners who had been held in the United
States in August, only 2,086 remained.
January, only one prisoner remained.

By the end of
This prisoner was no

longer held as a prisoner of war, however, but had joined
141 Germans and twenty Italians who had been incarcerated
in U.S. prisons.

He was held in the penitentiary at McNeil

Island, Washington.
freed. 73

The Japanese prisoners of war had been
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPACT OF INDOCTRINATION
Although the United States provided for all of the
physical needs of their prisoners, the Japanese training
toward and shame of capture continued to have a dramatic
impact on the prisoners, even after they had reached Ameri
can soil.

Many prisoners, when captured, requested that

they be allowed to commit suicide.

When the request was

invariably denied, the prisoners continued their quest by
other means.

Several incidents took place, the most dra

matic of which was at the prisoner of war camp in New
Caledonia, where twenty-three prisoners committed suicide
and two others attempted it in February of 1944.

However

by the time the prisoners reached the United States, sui
cide had almost always ceased to be an option.

While some

attempts were still made, very few were successful.
Kazuo Sakamaki lamented in I Attacked Pearl Harbor
that
we were simple-minded fighting men . . . . We
had been so trained that our thinking was all
concentrated on the most effective means of
expending our lives for a victory in war. Then
we failed in the one thing we had lived
for . . . .
How could we face our people again?
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Death by suicide was the only logical
solution to our predicament . . . .
Our desire for suicide, however, was
thwarted on every hand. We had no knives to
cut our throats. We had no ropes to hang
ourselves with. Some of us banged our heads
against every object in sight, and yet we did
not die. Some refused to eat. But the idea of
dying slowly was even more trying than living
hungrily.^
However, the prisoners soon began conforming, at least
outwardly, to their captors' standards for prisoners.
Sakamaki notes later in the text that the old-timers ex
tended the new prisoners a warm welcome and helped to
acclimatize them to their new surroundings.

In fact,

Sakamaki himself gave a speech to each incoming group of
prisoners, explaining that although he understood how they
felt, they must
respect the regulations we have set up . . . .
[and] abide by the laws and regulations per
taining to the prisoner of war. I know how
trying it will be for you to be a prisoner, but
for your own sake I advise you to restrain
yourself no matter how hard you find it . . . .
I know that since your capture you have
attempted more than once, at least in your
mind, to take your life into your own hands.
But you are now a prisoner, not a combatant,
and your life is governed not by the lawless
ness of war but by an international agreement.
If you have come with any idea of yourself
still being a soldier, abandon that idea at
once. You are not a combatant any more . . . .
No matter how much you may mourn over the
uniform of a prisoner of war you are wearing,
you cannot change the uniform . . . . We are
prisoners of war. We cannot be anything else
right now. If you will adjust your thinking to
the status of a prisoner of war, you will not
have to struggle so much. Your names are known
to the Japanese government through the Swiss
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government. That you are prisoners of war is
now public information. Death or any other
escape method will not alter the fact that you
were once a prisoner . . .
Suppose you have decided to hang yourself,
or fight the guard and be killed, or steal a
knife from the kitchen and cut your throat.
What will the world think of you . . . .
They
will not think you brave or praise you for
committing suicide. They will write about it
in papers and laugh about it . . . .
If you had wanted to die, you should have
died before coming here. You missed your last
chance to commit suicide. You and I are now
prisoners recognized as such by governments.
There is no more honor or freedom for suicide.
A suicide in the camp will only cause trouble
for others.
The Japanese prisoners still felt they had betrayed
the emperor, their homeland, and their families.
friends had given their lives while they lived.

Their
Their

friends had died in the finest tradition of the fighting
man and they were living in the most contemptuous state—
as prisoners of the enemy.

Because of this, they felt they

would be hated and despised, even by their closest family,
when they returned home after the war.

Desperate for

acceptance, they developed new and close social ties with
each other "which tended to overshadow all former social
ties and, in keeping with Japanese cultural conditioning,
involved rights and obligations which apparently were
rigorously adhered to."^
They also developed hobbies to keep their minds occu
pied.

Some engaged in the vigorous sports programs provid

ed by the camp.

Others studied or read.

One prisoner,
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Lt. Commander Matsumoto, even made paper dolls.

Those who

could not find an outlet or some way to keep their minds
off of their condition soon went crazy.

Commander Naka-

mune, one of the first senior officers captured, was the
first to do so.
Commander Nakamune was the Chief Engineer on the
aircraft carrier Hiryu.

He was captured at Midway, after

the ship went down and he and a few other survivors had
drifted in a lifeboat for fifteen days.

He continually

attempted suicide, but never succeeded.

He began imagining

that the U.S. government was transmitting waves of electric
ether at the prisoners and so spent much time in the bath,
which he thought protected him.

If caught out of the bath,

he would wrap a wet towel full of broken glass around his
head.

This, he felt, would prevent the electricity from

penetrating to him.

One day, after "jumping around in the

camp ground shouting madly", he was permanently assigned to
the infirmary.

Although he was the first, he was not the

•
• sanity.
•
6
only prisoner
to lose his
With few exceptions, however, the Japanese prisoners
quickly became very cooperative and discharged all assigned
duties with few complaints, at least until the middle of
1944.

However, as greater numbers of prisoners began

arriving from the battles in the Pacific, the prisoners
became more apathetic and uncooperative.

This culminated

in a battle of wills at Camp McCoy on May 30, 1944.
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When vast numbers of new prisoners were brought into
the camps, telling of long strings of Japanese reverses,
this exacerbated the older prisoners' fragile psychological
conditions, since they had assumed that American newspaper
articles on the war were only propaganda.
conceive of a Japanese defeat.

Many could not

Others questioned how their

treatment would change when Japan was no longer a threat
and wondered what would happen to them after the war was
over.

In addition, rivalries began to develop between the

old prisoners and the new, which compounded the already
severe problems between Army and Navy prisoners.

These

conflicts made the prisoners even more anxious to do any
thing which would remove or lessen the stigma of being
taken prisoner and prove them a "good" Japanese soldier.
The requirement in the Geneva Convention that forced
them to labor for their captors provided just such an
opportunity.
Convention.

The Japanese had never fully understood the
Their country had not been one of the signato

ries and, although it later agreed to abide by its regula
tions, Japan had never taught its soldiers anything about
it, knowing that any such training would negate their
training against surrender.

Thus, when their captors told

the prisoners they were required to work for them, the
prisoners understandably felt they would be further betray
ing their country by doing so.

For this reason, and for

those cited above, on May 30, 1944, many prisoners at Camp
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McCoy refused to accomplish assigned tasks and others,
even those who otherwise would have completed their duties,
were pressured into non-compliance as well.
According to a War Department report on the matter,
"the Japanese had always disliked working on such jobs as
ditch digging, road repairing and similar maintenance jobs
within the military reservation, adopting the attitude that
such labor was of assistance to [the U.S.'s] war effort."
However, they had always accomplished the duties, albeit
with growing discontent, until May 30, at approximately
2:00

p.m., when the prisoners on a work detail refused to

move a tent frame as ordered by 1st Sgt. Boisvert Lambert,
the supervisor of their detail.

The senior Japanese offi

cer and former spokesman, Lt. Commander Matsumoto, who was
viewed as a steadying influence on the prisoners, was in
the hospital with a heart condition, so Lt. Kajashima, the
new spokesman, was sent for.

He was told to make his men

accomplish their task, but he refused to do so.

Lt. Col.

Rogers, the camp commander, then ordered Lt. Kajashima and
Ensign Sakamaki, who understood English, into the orderly
room, but they pretended not to understand the orders.

He

then asked the American interpreter, Sgt. Tamura, to get
the prisoners to work, but the officers would not pass
along the orders and the enlisted prisoners refused to work
without direct orders from their officers.
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Lt. Col. Rogers spent several hours trying to convince
the Japanese officers to change their minds and countermand
their orders, but they continually refused.

Finally,

seeing that the situation was out of control, he had the
officers moved into the prison ward of the post hospital,
which was about five miles from the POW camp and was the
only available space away from the other prisoners, without
allowing them any opportunity to give further orders to
their men.
He then called on the senior non-commissioned officer
prisoners and asked for their cooperation.

When the first

nine, out of a group of about ninety, refused to disobey
their officers and cooperate with the Americans, Lt. Col.
Rogers placed them in solitary confinement and restricted
their diets to bread and water.
At approximately the same time, 5:00 p.m., all of the
Japanese prisoners refused to eat the evening meal, which
was in the process of being prepared, to clean the mess
halls, or to police up or save the unused food.

Enlisted

men in the POW camp's hospital refused to take their medi
cine, for malaria, until forced to do so by the hospital
staff.

This was the beginning of what Lt. Col. Rogers

called a "G[h]andi sit down strike of passive resistance." 8
Bed check was normal that night, so Lt. Col. Rogers
and the post executive officer went to the hospital to see
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if Lt. Commander Matsumoto would issue the necessary or
ders.

He either would not or could not act.
The next morning, May 31, no cooks or K.P.'s showed up

at 6:30 a.m.

No food was prepared and no prisoners showed

up for mess.

At 7:50 a.m., roll call was attempted, but no

prisoners reported for their work details.

Instead, they

chose to sit or stand in the barracks or company area.
After issuing a clear warning to the NCO's, Lt. Col. Rogers
asked the post commander for reinforcements.
1620th Military Police Group arrived.

At 0815, the

Lt. Col. Rogers

explained to the unit that they were there to assert U.S.
authority and had them affix bayonets to their weapons.
The unit and the camp guards then marched all of the pris
oners except the officers and the nine NCO's in solitary
confinement, at the doubletime, one hundred and forty paces
a minute, the entire five mile journey down Highway 21 to
the prisoners' worksite.

The prisoners were forced to work

all morning then marched back to the camp for lunch in the
same manner.

Since many of the new prisoners had not yet

regained their strength from living in poor battlefield
conditions, several of them were not able to keep up with
the strenuous pace.

The guards hurried these stragglers

with jabs to the buttocks from their bayonets.

This con

tinued until the prisoner either kept up the required pace
or dropped from exhaustion or pain.

About twelve of the

prisoners received bayonet wounds and a few who could go no
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further were picked up by a truck driven behind the group
for just such a contingency.

While one of the guards

described the march as a "bloody mess," he also noted that
it accomplished its purpose.
At 12:01 p.m., the senior NCO for the prisoners in
formed Lt. Col. Rogers that the prisoners had had enough
and would now follow the orders of the American authori
ties.

Cooks and K.P.'s were assigned to the mess halls and

lunch was prepared and eaten.

Emergency details were

organized and sent to work at 2:00 p.m.

At 3:00 p.m., the

NCO's in solitary confinement were called in to see Lt.
Col. Rogers and all agreed to obey the American authori
ties, according to the Geneva Convention, since the offi
cers were no longer in the camp.
New spokesmen and company leaders were appointed and
the prisoners' chain of command was completely reorganized.
All prisoners, except the casualties from the march and
those medically excused, worked the rest of the day.

The

next day, the prisoners returned to work as scheduled.

The

German prisoners, who quickly heard of the ordeal, were
affected by the incident as well.

They quickly informed

their guards that no such action would be required for
them.
Soon after the incident, the prisoners requested a
visit from the Spanish Embassy in Washington, D.C., their
representatives to the Geneva Convention.

Senor Gonzales,
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the Spanish consul at Chicago, was sent to investigate.
Escorted by a member of the War Department, he completed a
cursory investigation of the camp and interviewed Lt. Col.
Rogers and the prisoners.

By the time of his visit, all

but about ten of the NCO's had refused to cooperate with
the Americans in any way.

Work was still being accom

plished by the prisoners, however, who were supervised by
the cooperative NCO's.

The non-cooperating NCO's said they

had no complaint with the handling of the incident, but
wanted to be housed with their officers, who were still in
the hospital at this time.

The officers, when contacted,

said they had no argument with this, but complained that
they were being punished illegally by being confined to the
hospital.

Lt. Col. Rogers informed the investigators that

he was awaiting orders to allow the NCO's and officers to
be housed together and that the officers were not being
held at the hospital as punishment, but that the hospital
was the only place to house them until space became avail
able at the camp.

He also noted that a separate camp was

being built for the Germans to help accommodate the large
influx of prisoners to the U.S. and that this would help
solve the problem.

Senor Gonzales said he felt no inappro

priate actions had been taken and that the camp was being
run properly, so he would send a 'good report' to the
Q
Embassy.
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A second incident occurred on a Sunday night, October
29, 1944, at Fitzsimmons General Hospital, Colorado.

Three

prisoners, Chief Gunner's Mate Kuzuhori Mankino, Warrant
Officer Saburo Nakagawa, and Private First Class Sadamu
Okada, were being treated

for tuberculosis.

Only two

months before, the three had attempted hari-kiri with
kitchen utensils from the hospital .

One of them had

completely opened his stomach, another had attempted the
same feat, and the third had inflicted a cut on his head,
but all three must have been recuperating well; they had
just received orders to be returned to McCoy.

Although

they were unaccustomed to drinking milk and had never
ordered it before, that night they ordered milk.

A hospi

tal orderly passed a bottle of milk through the door to
them "and they immediately threw the milk at the orderly,
and broke the glass all over the floor with the milk spill
ing around."-*-0

A nearby guard, armed with a billy club,

came to the assistance of the orderly.

They opened the

door and "insisted that the prisoners clean up the broken
glass and milk.

The prisoners became belligerent and

attacked the guard who used his club upon them."0-^- The
prisoners responded by attacking the guard with the handles
of the brooms and mops they had been using to clean the
room.

The guard broke his billy club on one of the prison

ers who then retrieved the broken end and hit the guard
over the head with it.

Another guard, this one armed with
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a carbine, had arrived from the guard office by this
time.

He aimed his weapon at the floor and fired, trying

to calm the situation.

However, the first guard, by some

means, was able to gain control of the rifle.

After re

portedly warning the prisoners with no response, he shot
three times.

Each shot hit its mark, as one prisoner was

• the heart.1 2
shot through the head and the other two in
A third incident, another strike, occurred at Camp
Clarinda on February 21, 1945.
10:00

The strike started at

a.m., when a work detail refused to continue work

because of weather conditions, a severe snowstorm having
just occurred in the vicinity.
suit.

Other work details followed

The strike was finally broken by the removal of all

food from the compound.

A Field Service Report on the

event noted that the camp commander there had adopted a
policy of extreme firmness, since most of the prisoners had
1O
refused to work.
Several escapes occurred as well.

While some of the

prisoners may have escaped briefly from work details with
out a record being kept, the only reported escapes by
Japanese prisoners came from McCoy and occurred between
July 3, 1944 and August 29, 1945.

The majority took place

in the last three months of the war.
Terumasa Kibata was the first reported Japanese pris
oner to escape.

At approximately 11:30 a.m. on July 3,

1944, while working on a new road, approximately eleven
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miles northeast of the camp, he slipped into the forest.
He "intended 'to catch a train and get away from the
camp'.

The local radio and press was advised of the

escape and a state-wide police bulletin was issued.

In

addition, an extensive search of the camp and surrounding
areas was conducted by FBI agents, local military person
nel, and surrounding police agencies.
provided by two army planes.

Air surveillance was

However, Kibata had no idea

of where he was heading or how to prolong his escape so
"after wandering in the woods, [he] decided to
surrender . . .

He reported to the Camp McCoy orderly

room the day after his escape and was quickly turned over
to the authorities at the nearby POW camp.

The authorities

blamed Kibata's escape on shell-shock.
The next escape involved three prisoners and was
better planned and organized.

Takeo Nakamura arrived at

Camp McCoy in August of 1944 and began formulating a plan
of escape in September.

"He recalled from his study of

geography in school that the Mississippi River ran into the
Gulf of Mexico and when he was brought from the West Coast
to the camp he recalled crossing the river and observing
the 'mountains running alongside the river near LaCrosse,
Wisconsin.'"XD
While Nakamura claimed to have no hope of reaching the
Gulf of Mexico or leaving the country, he explained that he
had violated a sacred obligation to his people and would
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probably be shot if returned to Japan.

He assumed he would

be shot when apprehended and believed this to be more
honorable than continuing to be held prisoner.
In January, he stole a road map of Wisconsin and a
topographical map of the camp.

In February, he met Hajine

Hashimoto and Kohei Tanaka when they were moved into the
same compound.

The three became friends and he enlisted

them as accomplices in his plan.

He explained part of his

plan to his new friends, in case they were separated after
the escape, but kept many of the details to himself.
Throughout the rest of the spring, the three gathered
materials they would need for the escape.

Once everything

was prepared, they waited for warmer weather and for a
stormy night, which would cover their escape.
At 8:00 p.m. on May 21, they decided to leave after
lights out.

A short time after 10:00 p.m., Nakamura, who

had pretended to fall asleep with his clothes on, cut
through the camp's fences with a pair of stolen bolt-cut
ters and prepared to wait for his friends, who were hiding
nearby.

However, as he slipped through the fence, the camp

dogs started barking and he became scared.
his friends after a short time.

He left without

He followed the railroad

tracks to the Mississippi River, which took five days, and
then stole a rowboat and headed downstream.

At approxi

mately 8:00 a.m. on May 28, five and one half days after
his escape, he was taken into custody by a commercial
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fisherman, who took him to the local sheriff's office.
From there, he was transferred to the custody of the FBI
and then to camp authorities.
Hashimoto and Tanaka also started towards the Missis
sippi River when they realized that Nakamura had left
without them.

However, since hashimoto's ankle had been

injured in battle, the rough terrain and miserable weather
forced them to leave the "mountain" area for the "flat
ground."

They began traveling on a country road and were

captured less than an hour later, at 4:00 p.m. on June 1,
by the LaCrosse County Police.

The two prisoners reported

that they wanted to reach San Francisco, where they entered
the U.S.
The other escapes took place soon after.

Kazuyuki

Maeda left a work project "to aid the U.S. Army without the
other Japanese in the camp knowing about it." 17

He left

between 1:30 and 4:30 p.m. on June 15 and was located
sometime after 5:30 p.m. the same day in a hospital area of
the camp.
Mitsuhei Hirosawa escaped during the night of July 3.
He "was recaptured without resistance July

8

, 1945, on a

farm, where he had stopped to ask for food, by a County
Traffic Officer."
reason for escaping.

He claimed to have "had no specific
He stated that he was lonely and

despondent at the camp because he had no friends and be
cause he found it most difficult to make friends.

He had
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no intention of going anywhere.
1Q
away from camp and be alone."

He merely wanted to get

The next prisoners escaped not to get away from the
camp, but rather to get away from the other prisoners, who
they felt would beat them up.
the fence July 4.

Masao Kitamura crawled under

The escape was discovered the next

morning at the 6:30 a.m. roll call, but Kitamura was cap
tured in the gondola of a freight train only on July 17.
He escaped "because he had lost face with his fellow pris
oners ." 2 0
Mitsuo Yamamoto escaped from a grass cutting detail at
approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same day that Kitamura was
recaptured.

Almost exactly two days later, he was "seen

crossing a road on his hands and knees . . . on the South
•
O1
Range of the military reservation."
He escaped because
he thought the other prisoners would beat him up for an
action he had taken of which they disapproved.
Toshio Yano escaped from a work detail on July 28
because he felt the other prisoners suspected he was an
informant.

He was captured the next day, still on the

reservation.
The next prisoners to escape were Nobumori Kikuchi and
Hideo Matsuzaki.

They were tired of living in the camp and

walked away from a work detail August 9.

They were recap

tured two days later walking down the railroad tracks
leading from the camp.
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Yuzo Ohashi was the last Japanese prisoner to escape.
He walked away from a work detail at 9:00 a.m., August 29.
He "walked south for several days . . . towards Mexico,
which he believed to be located about 300 miles south of
camp McCoy."

He escaped because he believed the war was

over and did not want to be returned to Japan, where he had
9o
lost face.
Another response to Japanese training relating to the
shame of capture was voluntary cooperation with the United
States.

There are many recorded instances of prisoners

going back into their own lines to convince others to
surrender.^

Other prisoners chose to help the U.S. in

other ways as well, some even volunteering to fight against
Japan.

However, the most extreme example of this behav

ior involved the politically liberal-radical prisoners who
helped the United States begin their reeducation program
for the Japanese prisoners.
Records show that the Navy had begun recognizing signs
of discontent with Japan among its prisoners as early as
September of

1944.^6

By February, 1945, they had trans

ferred a prisoner from Australia to learn about the under
current of discontent in Japan and, if possible, the under
ground movement there.

However, serious consideration for

the reeducation program came from two events occurring soon
thereafter.
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Andrew Roth, a Naval Reserve Lieutenant, advised the
U.S. Navy to sponsor a "Free Japan" movement among the
prisoners.

This movement would provide a U.S. alternative

to the militarists in power and to left-wing, communistic
opposition groups by training future Japanese Democratic
leaders.

He argued the need for such a program by explain

ing that there was a high probability of an imminent Japa
nese surrender and showing the possibilities of a Japanese
civil war or the emergence of a communist regime soon after
if left unresolved.
The reeducation program, he continued, was allowed
under the Geneva Convention, as long as it was voluntary,
and would "provide a much needed intelligence service to
the Navy, Army, and other agencies dealing with the
problem of military administration in Japanese
97

territories . . . ."

. .

. . .

He gave additional credibility to

such a program by showing its similarity to the successful
Communist Chinese program.
A week later, two Japanese prisoners being interrogat
ed at Byron Hot Springs admitted to being members of a
group of prisoners "dedicated to the overthrow of Japanese
militarism and to cooperate with American forces and authorities for the achievement of those ends."

This

would, they hoped, allow Japan to become a modern nation.
The movement had been organized at Sand Island, Hawaii
and consisted of approximately thirty members, mostly
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graduates of universities or other higher education who had
been part of Japan's liberal intelligensia.

Many had been

members of opposition groups before the war and some had
even been imprisoned for their political views and actions.
The prisoners explained that the group had been scat
tered by transfers, but requested that they be reassembled
in a special camp, away from the other prisoners, where
they could be indoctrinated with democratic principles and
develop into strong, resourceful leaders.
The group's program, and that of the Japanese liberalradical movement in general, had three objectives:

the

complete destruction of the militarists and their philoso
phies; a complete political reformation, including the
establishment of a representative government; and a reedu
cation of Japan along modern, free-thinking, non-superstitious lines.

The POW group conceived

"itself as part of a

powerful post-war group operating openly along usual propa
gandists lines for the winning of the Japanese people over
to their point of view and the consolidation of an irre
versible popular opposition to the traditional militaris. .
. . .
.
. .
?g
tic-impenalistic-capitalistic Japan.
This group would serve as the nucleus for a larger
group, which would be made up of prisoners who agreed with
the group's philosophies.

The larger group, estimated at

about one hundred, would be trained for psychological
warfare and would be used in many different areas.

These
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areas included direct voice surrender talks, writing propa
ganda leaflets, giving radio broadcasts, assisting in
analysis of interrogation materials, infiltrating China and
Japan for intelligence and information about American
prisoners, appealing to well-educated "intellectuals" in
Japan, and puncturing the Emperor-divinxty mythology.
During this same period, the Army and the State De
partment had begun considering similar operations of their
own, involving both prisoners of war and Japanese aliens in
the United States.

Very special care was being taken by

each group to "devise and impose such controls as [were]
necessary to ensure political objectives and methods which
[were] American and not Communistic m

nature."

In fact,

Captain Okino, a Japanese Navy officer who had expressed
his hopes for the eventual establishment of a democratic
government in Japan, was suggested as the leader of the
Navy group, to act as a stabilizing factor and to keep the
group on the proper course.

Also, since most, if not all,

of the prisoners to be used were well known to the Japanese
police, the Navy reviewed the need to offer them special
protection, possibly even involving new identities and
documents.

By March 16, although senior Navy leaders

suggested separating the project into military and politi
cal programs and giving the political program to the State
Department, the Office of War Information, or OSS, the
program had been approved.

Plans were made to cooperate
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with the Army and the State Department, although the Navy
hoped to retain the initiative and control of the project.
By March 24, Admiral Thebaud, the Director of Naval
Intelligence, separated the program into political and
military objectives, since the "division of interest and
objective [would] probably necessitate segregation of those
Japanese to be used by the War and Navy Departments from
the remainder",

and requested immediate steps to start

the program in a camp designed for one hundred prisoners
and filled with an Indoctrination Staff.

The military

program would be run by the War and Navy Departments and
the reeducation would be run by the State, War, and Navy
Departments.

Other agencies would "be permitted to partic

ipate but not control or direct" the programs. ^

C.K.

Parker, who had interrogated the first two prisoners, then
provided a list of the prisoners willing to cooperate,
.

.

.

including a few biographical notes on each.

1R

By the 1st of April, the Army responded.

They agreed

that the program would help U.S. psychological warfare, but
refused to seriously consider "the infiltration of former
Japanese prisoners of war before or during landing operaO /T

tions for espionage, sabotage, or propaganda purposes."
They also suggested that the political program would be
ineffective since, in their opinion, the Chinese program
had been ineffective as well.

However, Colonel E.F.H.

Svensson was designated as the Army representative for
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further investigation into the project. The Navy responded
by designating Captain E.S. Pearce as the Naval representa
tive .^
The Navy again pressed for a separate camp, explaining
that if the prisoners were transferred to permanent camps,
they would "be subjected to the influence of Japanese
Nationalists on one hand and antagonism from guards on the
other."

O O

They also noted that the prxsoners were "not

merely interested or friendly individuals who have been
persuaded to help us.

They are men who are dead in earnest

about the project they hope to undertake and are already
convinced of rts importance."
While the Army and Naval representatives discussed the
program, the OSS met with the three "special project pris
oners" to see if they would be useful to the OSS in propa
ganda work.

The meeting was held at 2:00 p.m. on Saturday,

April 14, at the San Francisco Delousing Plant and was a
resounding success.
meeting

The prisoners were driven to the

in a closed van and interviewed by a first genera

tion Japanese-American.

They discussed their background

and conditions in Japan as well as the possibility of
cooperation.

Then samples of propaganda material they had

previously prepared were shown.

Finally, the prisoners

were given a ride through San Francisco to show "how normal
life in the city was during war times.
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Three weeks later, May 4, 1945, the first "special
project prisoner" was released from Byron Hot Springs to
the Army.

He was given to the OSS for propaganda use.

This irritated the Navy, who felt the Army was "somewhat
freehanded" with Naval prisoners, and Byron Hot Springs was
directed to keep the other two prisoners until a final plan
for the program had been approved.^
On July 14, the Provost Marshal General presented the
Army's proposed indoctrination program.

John K. Emmerson

of the Department of State, Charles W. Hepner of the Japa
nese Section, Office of War Information, and the Special
Projects Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office
had conducted a secret study of the Japanese prisoners at
Camps McCoy, Clarinda, and Angel Island.

The Army had

determined that such an indoctrination program would pro
vide the American forces in Japan with reliable government
officials to work with and test the educational and reha
bilitation programs that were being considered for use
during the postwar period.

Mr. Emmerson and Mr. Hepner had

"jointly recommended that [the] officers and non-commis
sioned officers be segregated from the remainder of the
prisoners before any organized course of indoctrination was
u n d e r t a k e n . T h i s had been done, as the Army had trans
ferred all but the most cooperative officers and NCO's from
Camp McCoy to Camp Kenedy, Texas.
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The Army's program proposed the establishment of an
indoctrination camp, commanded by a lieutenant colonel with
a knowledge of Japan and the Japanese language, which would
follow the pattern of the German reorientation program.
The prisoners were to study current events, American histo
ry and institutions, and the English language.4^

On July

18, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army approved the
program and the Army began searching for an appropriate
camp for the program.44

Camp Hulen, Texas, an inactive

camp in an isolated area was proposed for the site, but was
quickly rejected in favor of Camp Huntsville, Texas.

Two

days after the program had been approved, the Army began
transferring its German prisoners out of Huntsville and
preparing it for use as a Japanese reeducation center.
Lt. Col. Boude C. Moore became the director of the
reeducation program.

He had been born in Japan and had

lived there from 1924 to 1941.

He was assisted by Dr.

Hepner, one of the two men responsible for the program.4^
The Japanese prisoners were screened and evaluated and an
initial group of the most cooperative were selected for
special training.

They studied "the English language and

literature, comparisons of American and Japanese news
papers, books, and magazines" and listened to a "dazzling
program of lectures by the faculty of nearby Sam Houston
State Teachers College, with simultaneous translation into
Japanese."47

They also edited and published a newspaper,
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which was printed for distribution to the other Japanese
A Q

prisoners, similar to the German Per Ruf.

They were

encouraged to attend worship services held each Sunday "to
replace their traditional Emperor worship with a more
positive philosophy, and to show them the close relation•
49
ships between democracy and Christxan principles."
The most important activity in the camp, however, was
the individual and group study of certain topics "relating
to the principles of American democracy and their applica
tion in J a p a n . " T h e topics ranged from an assessment of
Japan's civilian and military morale to the comparison of
various segments of Japanese and American ways of life." 51
These studies required both research and discussion and
were meant to "require some measure of democratic input"
from each prisoner and "serve as a barometer of the POW's
morale and allegiance to the Emperor."
By December, when the prisoners began to be repatriat
ed, a total of 205 prisoners had been selected and sent to
either Camp Huntsville, Camp Kenedy, or Camp Hearne,
Texas.

c o

#

Other prisoners, not selected for the special

training, received books and brochures especially translat
ed into Japanese for the their use, watched "suitable"
motion pictures and filmstrips, and worked with an American
officer whose sole job was "to foster the orientation
program within the camp. 54
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Although much work was put into these reeducation
programs, no study was done to determine the impact of the
programs on the Japanese prisoners or Japanese post-war
politics.
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CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION
The United States entered World War II totally unpre
pared for the war or for the prisoners they would soon
receive.

However, they quickly developed a system to care

for their prisoners that dealt with almost every conceiva
ble contingency.

The men in charge of the Japanese prison

ers ensured the prisoners were well cared for, even though
the American populace, as a whole, despised and distrusted
the Japanese, as was seen by the internment of the Japanese-Americans, the ready acceptance of American atrocities
in the Pacific, and the mob action at Marengo, Illinois.
Upon their arrival in the United States, the prisoners
were treated rather brusquely because of the administrative
and health requirements, but by the time they reached Byron
Hot Springs, conditions had improved dramatically.

The

prisoners were required to obey strict rules and adhere to
inflexible schedules, but they were able to regain some
measure of the self-respect they felt they had lost when
captured since they were treated as humans, rather than
outcasts or non-entities.

The interrogators were especial

ly trained to deal with the prisoners and to appear
omniscient and all-powerful.

This allowed them to assume
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the role of benevolent protector to the prisoners.
When the prisoners were transferred to their permanent
camps, conditions remained much the same.

They were still

treated with firm discipline and held to a rigid schedule,
which now included work details, but were they well provid
ed for and allowed to maintain some independence, though
only in certain areas.
When the reeducation project started, the prisoners
were divided into smaller groups of more cooperative and
less cooperative prisoners.

This allowed those who chose

to be most cooperative even more latitude in their daily
decisions, although they were still prisoners of war and
treated as such.
There were several reasons for this humane treatment.
Most, if not all, of the men in charge of the Japanese
prisoners had a broad knowledge of Japan and its people.
The interrogators at Byron Hot Springs all spoke Japanese
fluently and had been chosen for their knowledge of the
area, even if they were not Nisei or Issei.

Lt. Col.

Rogers, commander at Camp McCoy, was considered a "Jap
lover" by some of his men.^

Lt. Col. Weaver, commander at

Camp Livingston, told Sakamaki while he was there that:
My brother was a lieutenant of the United
States Navy. He was with the cruiser Astoria.
You recall that when your ambassador, Mr.
Saito, died, the cruiser took the body of the
ambassador to Japan. My brother received fine
treatment from the Japanese people. He was
always saying good things about the land of
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cherry blossoms. Then, when this war came,
both he and the Astoria were sunk by the
Japanese. I cannot like the Japan that caused
the death of my brother, but I would not forget
the things he said about your country and
people. You can rest assured that I will do my
duty as the commander of this camp to the best
of my ability.
Lt. Col. Boude C. Moore, the man in charge of the
reeducation program, had grown up in Japan.

These men had

a respect for and at least some understanding of the Japa
nese people and their culture.

However, this was not the

only reason for their considerate treatment of the prison
ers.

No American wanted to give the Japanese any excuse to

mistreat American prisoners in retaliation to a perceived
mistreatment of Japanese prisoners in America. Neither did
they want world opinion turned against them, as the Japa
nese had attemted after a revolt on February 25, 1943, at
Camp Featherston, New Zealand, and after a second on August
5, 1944, at Cowra, Australia.

Additionally, the Japanese

prisoners had been trained to expect mistreatment at the
hands of their captors.

Thus, when mistreated or abused,

they tended to become sullen and defiant, feeling that, in
some way, they were helping to make up for being captured.
However, when well-treated, they did not know how to re
spond.

Many reacted, as was seen in chapter five, by

assisting the United States in various ways.

In fact, when

reports arrived at Byron Hot Springs that the prisoners at
Clarinda were being routinely beaten by the guards, William
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P. Woodard, the officer in charge of Byron Hot Springs,
quickly urged a stop to the practice.

His explained his

actions not in terms of human rights violations or because
the actions were prohibited by the Geneva Convention, but
by noting that if the prisoners were needed for further
interrogation, he did not want them to be antagonistic to
the U.S.^

Therefore, although few Japanese prisoners

reached American soil, those who did
were well cared for because of American self-interest and
the consideration and understanding of the men in charge of
their internment.
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APPENDIX ONE

THE KOREANS
No history of the Japanese prisoners of war in World
War II would be complete without mentioning the Korean
prisoners.

While the Korean prisoners had technically

fought on the side of Japan, it is doubtful that anyone
hated the Japanese more.

Korea had once been an independ

ent nation, but had been occupied by the Japanese since the
turn of the century.

For thirty years, the Japanese had

treated the Koreans with contempt and disrespect.^

Then,

with the beginning of war, the treatment became worse.
After January, 1944, the Japanese had conscripted any
Korean between the ages of twenty and twenty-one who had
five years of primary education and any Korean between
twenty-one and twenty-five who was in good physical condition, regardless of educational level.

Although no com

plete records were kept, the impact of this can be seen by
noting that "in one village of 93 houses, 30 men were
•
.
conscripted
in
the years of 1942-43" alone.

The Koreans

were conscripted for only two year terms, but "it was
believed that many were kept for three years or longer."^
Once in the service, they were treated horribly by the
Japanese.

In fact, several prisoners stated that the
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Koreans were treated worse than Allied prisoners.

They

were "required to do the worst type of work and those used
in the coal or iron mines were always found in the deepest
and hottest places."

When there was any possibility of

their surrender, they were immediately killed.

"One P/W

captured on Saipan saw two women with babies strapped on
their backs heading for American lines.

A lieutenant,

hiding in the same cave with them, killed them all for
security reasons and would have killed [the] P/W had he
known he was Korean."0

On another occasion, when a Korean

attempted to escape from a coal mining camp near Yoshima,
he was "apprehended, taken to Yoshima and, after being
.

.

.

tortured for fifteen days, was imprisoned."

7

These insults and atrocities developed a fierce hatred
of the Japanese among the Koreans.

When captured, they

often volunteered to help their captors in any way possible
and, on several occasions, volunteered to fight with the
Americans against the Japanese.^
In fact, the Korean National Committee even proposed
in a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War that the
Korean prisoners' "services should be utilized as an aid in
the American war effort and as a Korean contribution to the
.
.
.
.
Q
United Nations at war with Japan and her Allies."
More
specifically, the Committee proposed "that these Koreans
serve as labor units in American occupied territories, as
aid to military intelligence, as infiltrative van to enemy
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territories, as liaison details in relation to other Ko
reans as may still be found in increased service of the
Japanese" in order to advance the cause of Korean independ
ence .^
The Judge Advocate General, after reading the propos
al, determined that, although any use of the Korean prison
ers of war for these purposes would violate Article 31 of
the Geneva Convention, the United States could release them
from their status as prisoners of war and then be able to
legally accept their voluntary services without violating
international law.

However, this would not preclude the

Japanese from declaring the Koreans guilty of treason and
executing them if they were recaptured, as the U.S. could
find no basis for recognizing Korea as an independent
nation.^ ^
When the U.S. chose to utilize Korean labor for the
war effort without releasing them from their status as
prisoners, Joseph R. Farrington, the U.S. Representative
from Hawaii, asked that they be reclassified as a Korean
service unit.

This would "serve to reward them appropri

ately for their good conduct and numerous and consistent
manifestations of friendship to the United States and
opposition to Japan;

contribute in an important way to

friendship between this country [U.S.] and Korea in the
future; win the lasting gratitude of the permanent resi
dents of this country of Korean extraction . . . , and
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reduce the military overhead required to maintain a prison
er of war camp, and thereby release that many more soldiers
19
. . .
,
to their homes."
There is no indication that the mili
tary accepted this advice.
Even without this recognition, the Koreans continued
to press their battle against Japan.

In March, 1944, the

Korean prisoners, led by Ch'anghwan Kim, formed the Kanshu,
or Korean Eagle, Party.

This party was dedicated to "repay

at least in some slight measure the favors of our benefac
tor, the United States," and to form a Korean independence
movement.

To accomplish these purposes, the members were

to offer their lives to America and their homeland" to
"fight for the righteous United Nations forces until the
day of the final annihilation of Japan and Germany," who
were responsible for both the war and the fact that they
were held as prisoners.^
The chartering members of the group felt that all
Korean prisoners were duty bound to join the organization
and respect its precepts.

Dues would be used to defray the

expenses of the club and U.S. military forces.

The U.S.,

while acknowledging the party, required membership to be
both voluntary and free. 1R
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APPENDIX TWO

MONTHLY CENSUS OF PRISONERS
End of month
December 1941

German

Italian

Japanese
1

Total
1
1
1
1
1
32
33
49
65
177
183
431
1,881

January 1942
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

31
32
39
55
130
130
380
512

1,317

1
1
1
1
1
1
10
10
47
53
51
52

January 1943
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

990
1,026
1,334
2,146
22,110
34,161
54,502
94,220
115,358
119,401
122,350
123,440

1,313
1,356
1,359
2,799
13,911
19,212
25,969
35,986
48,253
48,252
49,039
49,323

62
62
62
62
62
62
87
93
95
95
95
116

2,365
2,444
2,755
5,007
36,083
53,435
80,588
130,299
163,706
167,748
171,484
172,879

January 1944
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

124,822
127,252
133,135
133,967
135,796
146,101
173,980
192,868
248,205
248,781
306,856
306,581

49,826
49,993
50,136
50,168
50,164
50,278
50,276
50,272
51,034
51,032
51,156
51,071

116
142
347
367
408
569
607
730
1,143
1,242
2,443
2,629

174,822
177,387
183,618
184,502
186,368
196,948
224,863
243,870
300,382
338,055
360,455
360,281
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End of Month

German

Italian

Japanese

Total

January 1945
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

306,306
307,404
312,144
345,920
271,683
371,505
367,513
361,322
355,458
351,150
324,623
313,234

50,561
50,571
50,550
50,304
50,273
50,052
49,789
49,184
42,915
35,065
29,539
25,696

2,820
3,021
3,260
3,294
3,915
4,249
4,828
5,413
4,938
4,930
4,257
2,086

359,687
360,996
365,954
399,518
425,871
425,806
422,130
415,919
403,311
391,145
358,419
341,016

January 1946
February
March
April
May
June

275,078
208,403
140,572
84,177
37,460
141

11,532
561
33
31
30
20

1
1
1
1
1
1

286,611
208,965
140,606
84,209
37,491
162

There were 32,000 PW's on military and civilian work
projects which terminated 15 June 1946. All PW 's were
repatriated by 30 June 1946 except 141 Germans, 20 Italians, and 1 Japanese serving sentences in U.S. penal insti
tutions. Information gathered from U.S. Provost Marshal
General, "Reports on Prisoners of War, 1942-1946."

APPENDIX THREE

RULES AND REGULATIONS
APPLICABLE TO PRISONERS
1. The prisoners will be organized into sections under
their own officers and non-commissioned officers who will
be responsible for their conduct. Prisoner of War officers
and non-commissioned officers who fail to perform properly
their duties of supervision of the men under them, or any
other duty with which they may be entrusted, will be pun
ished as offenders against good order and discipline.
2. No prisoner will be allowed to have in his possession
any matches, knives, sharp instruments, razor blades,
weapons of any description, photographic apparatus, field
glasses, lamps, flashlights, inflammable articles, maps,
tools, or money.
3. Smoking by prisoners is not permitted in any portion of
the main building and mess hall. Smoking will be permitted
in the recreational area and in latrines when recreational
area cannot be used.
4. The prisoners will not be permitted to take knives and
forks from the mess hall.
5. The necessary number of prisoners may be used at any
time in the mess hall as kitchen police under the supervi
sion of the mess sergeant.
6. Under the supervision of the Surgeon, each prisoner
will be required to bathe at stated intervals and keep his
person and clothing in a sanitary condition.
7. Arrangements for hair cutting will be made by providing
barbers from among the prisoners.
8. A daily inspection of prisoners, dormitories, latrines
and mess building will be made by the Commanding Officer or
such other officer as he may designate.
9. A physical inspection of the prisoners and a sanitary
inspection of the enclosure will be made at stated inter
vals by the Surgeon.
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11. Each prisoner will make his own bed daily immediately
upon arising and in the manner prescribed by the Commanding
Officer.
12. Any prisoner conducting himself in a disorderly manner
will be segregated from the other prisoners.
13. Any prisoner refusing to halt when ordered to do so by
a sentry or guard will be fired on.
14. Prisoners will be required to salute all officers of
the United States Army as prescribed for United States
Troops.
15. Any prisoner who violates any lawful order or commits
any military offense will be tried in the manner prescribed
by law.
16. a. In case of fire all prisoners will assemble in the
recreational area, and wait there until further orders.
b. In case of a "black out”, prisoners will remain in
their dormitories.
17. All prisoners will adhere to the following daily
schedule:
5:30am - Lights on in sleeping quarters and check of pris
oners. Prisoners will immediately police their persons,
bunks and proceed with general inside policing of barracks
until breakfast.
6:30am - Breakfast. Just as soon as the mess sergeant
notifies the sergeant of the guard that breakfast is ready,
the sergeant of the guard will require the prisoners,
excepting the sick prisoners, to fall out immediately and
form at the north entrance to the mess hall.
7:00am - Outside fatigue when ordered. One outside detail
will daily police Headquarters Office and vicinity. The
inside detail will proceed immediately to the barracks and
complete policing up the barracks. All prisoners, except
ing those on the inside detail and those who are ill, will
vacate the barracks on or before 7:00am, except on days of
inclimate [sic] weather, and will remain in the recreation
area until after the enclosure is inspected. The inside
detail will vacated the barracks just as soon as their work
is completed. During inclimate [sic] weather the prisoners
will be permitted to remain in the barracks, but during
inspection they will be required to stand by their bunks.
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8:30am - The sergeant of the guard will notify the Dispen
sary at or before 8:30am the exact number of prisoners
remaining in their bunks because of illness.
11:00am - Recall.
11:50am - Check of prisoners.
12:00 Noon - Dinner.
1:30pm - Recreation or fatigue when ordered.
3:30pm - Bathing, shaving, washing of clothing or fatigue
when ordered.
5:30pm - Supper.
8:15pm - All in quarters.
8:20pm - Check prisoners.
9:00pm - Lights out.
18. These rules and regulations may be changed, varied,
altered or modified and new or additional regulations
prescribed from time to time, as circumstances may require.
Information from Rules and Regulations Applicable to
Prisoners at Angel Island, California, dated 2 September
1944, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau,
Reporting Branch, Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspection and
Field Reports, Angel Island.

APPENDIX FOUR

ITEMS ISSUED TO PRISONERS
Quantity per
individual

Item

Bags, Barrack
Bed, Sacks
Belts, Waist
Blankets or Comforters
Breeches, cotton, or trousers,working
Caps, or Hats, cotton
Coat, Cotton Khaki or Coat-working, denim
Coats, wool
Cots, canvas
Drawers, cotton
Gloves or Mittens

1
2
1
2
2 pair*
1
2*
1
1
4 pair
1 pair

*When deemed necessary by the camp commander.
Leggins (when Breeches areissued)
Overcoats (or suitable substitute)
Raincoat (dismounted)
Pillows
Shirts
Shoes

1 pair
1
1
1
2
1 pair

A second pair of shoes is authorized for issue when
deemed necessary by the camp commander to safeguard the
health of prisoners against inclement weather.
Socks
Trousers or Breeches (wool)
Undershirts, cotton

4 pair
2 pair
4

Straw or an adequate substitute for bedding may be
issued at the rate of 15 pounds per man per month.
In addition, the following items are authorized for
officer prisoners:
Cases, pillow
Chair, steel or folding

2
1
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Cot, steel or bedstead,
Covers, mattress
Mattress
Sheets, bed

wooden

1
2**
1
4

**In lieu of, not in addition to, bedsacks.
Items of clothing and equipage will be supplied from
the following sources in the indicated order of priority:
(1) Obsolete Stock.
(2) CCC stock, except spruce green outer clothing.
(3) Class "X" Stock.
(4) Class B Stock.
(5) New stock, except that new stock of outer cloth
ing and shoes, will be utilized only in cases of emergency.
Toilet articles, barber's and tailor's supplies will
be issued in accordance with paragraph 10, AR 6003-75, 17
May 1943, which states that the value of such supplies will
not exceed one dollar per man per month. The following
items are authorized:
Blades, safety, razor
Brooms, whisk
Brushes, shaving
Brushes, shoe
Brushes, tooth
Buttons
Clippers, hair
Combs, medium
Handkerchiefs

Laces, shoe
Needles
Polish, shoe, or dubbin
Powder or paste, tooth
Razor, safety
Soap, hand
Soap, shaving
Thread
Towels

A record of all clothing and equipment will be kept as
provided for the enlisted men of the Army.
The following is a table of allowances of general
supplies:
Item

Quantity

Remarks & Basis
of Issue

Chinaware (thick ware):
Per
Boat, sauce, 13 oz.
1
Bowl, general issue
or plate, soup
Per
1
Bowl, sugar, with
cover, 17 oz.
capacity
1
Per
Cup, coffee,
Per
unhandled
1
Dish, vegetable,

10 men capacity
man
5 men
man
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11-7/8 in. width
(Bakers) (Plate,
soup may be
substituted)
Plate, dinner,
9-5/8 in. dia.
Saucer, coffee

1

Per 2 men

1
1

Per man
Per man

Glassware:
Bottle, vinegar with
stoppers, 14-1/2
oz. cap.
Pitcher, syrup,
20 oz. capacity
Shaker, salt
Shaker, pepper
Tumbler, 10 oz. cap.

1

Per 10 men

Per 2 men
1
Per 10 men
1
Per 10 men
1
Per man
1
Kitchen Utensils:
Per 150 men
1
Bowl, mixing, large
Per 150 men
Brush, meat block, wire 1
Cleaver, butchers
Per 75 men
1
8 in. blade
Per mess
1
Clock
Colander, 5-1/4 in.
Per mess
1
x 6 1/2 in.
Dipper, tin or
Per 30 men
1
enamelware 1-2 qt.
Fork, cook, flesh,
Per 30 men
1
2 tine, 15 in.
Fork, cook, flesh,
Per mess
1
2 tine, 21 in.
Per mess
2
Grater, vegetable
Griddle, cast iron,
Per 75 men or major
1
20x20
fraction thereof
but not to exceed
5 per mess.
Per 75 men
Knife, boning
1
Per 75 men
Knife, bread, 10 in.
1
blade
Knife, butcher
Per 75 men
1
10 in. blade
Per 75 men or major
Knife, cooks
1
fraction
thereof
Per 25 men or major
1
Knife, paring
fraction
thereof
Per 40 men or major
1
Ladle, 4-1/2 in. dia
fraction thereof
bowl 15 in.
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Ladle, 4-1/2 in. dia.
1
bowl 21 in.
ofMachine, hand operated
chopper or grinder
(meat and food),
large
1
Masher, potato pounder
Measurer, 1/2 qt.
tin or enamel
1
Measure, 1 qt.
tin or enamel
1
Opener, can,
hand operated
1
Pan, bake & roast
4-3/4xl2-l/2x
20-1/4 in.
1
Pan, bake & roast
4-3/4x20-1/4x
26-1/4 in.
(100 ration)
1
Pan, baking sheet,
1x18x25 in.
1
Pan, cake or pie,
9 in.
1
Pan, dish
1
Pan, frying, 12 in.
1
Peeler, potato
1
Pin, rolling
1
Pots, stock, with
cover, 10 gal.
1
Pots, stock, with
cover, 15 gal.
1
Pots, stock, with
cover, 20 gal.
1
Saw, butcher, 22 in.
1
Scale, weighing,
counter scoop,
10 lbs.
1
Scraper, dough,
6 in.
1
Sieve, flour,
wood, 18 in.
1
Skimmer
1
Spatula, wood,
37 in.
1
Spoon, basting,
15 in.
1
Spoon, basting,
21 in.
1
Spoon, serving,
slotted
1

Per 40 men or major
fraction there-

1

Per 75 men
Per 150 men
Per 150 men
Per 150 men
Per 25 men
Per 25 men

Per 50 men
Per 30 men
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per

6 men
30 men
75 men
25 men
150 men

Per 50 men
Per 50 men
Per 75 men
Per 75 men
Per mess
Per 75 men
Per 150 men
Per 75 men
Per 75 men
Per 25 men
Per mess
Per 40 men
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Steel, butchers',
10 in.
Stone, sharpening
Turner, cake,
15 in.
Whip, egg, 12 in.
Whip, egg, 16 in.

1
1

Per 150 men
Per mess

1
1
1

Per 40 men
Per 75 men
Per 75 men

Miscellaneous:
Axe, handled,
chopping,
single,
standard grade
3-1/2-4 lb.
3
Bit Board, wash
1
Brooms, corn
1
Brush, floor,
1
scrubbing, hand
Bucket, general purpose
galvanized 14 qt.
1
Can, ash or garbage,
galvanized w/ cover
(approx. 32 gal.)
1
Candles, pound
1

Handles, mop,
Handle, mop,
spring

1

Per
Per
Per
Per

company
25 men
14 men per month
14 men per month

Per 20 men
Per 25 men
Per 60 men per day
when no other
light is
furnished.
Per 50 men or frac
tion level there-

of
Irons, hand
Mop, cotton
Fork, table
Knife, table grill
Pitcher, water
5-1/2 qt.
Platter, meat
Spoon, table (med.)
Spoon, table
(serving)
Spoon, tea

5
1

per annum
Per company
Per 25 men per month

Tableware:
1
1

Per man
Per man

1
1
1

Per 10 men
Per 10 men
Per man

1
1

Per 2 men
Per man

Information found in Prisoner of War Circular #1,
Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division,
Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1942-1945,
383.6, Misc. to Camp Policy.
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SUGGESTED MENUS
Menu for the 1st, 11th, and 21st Days
Breakfast
Wheat Cereal
Potatoes
Salt Pork
w/ Milk Gravy
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Milk
Tea

Dinner
Oriental Stew
Boiled Rice
Cauliflower
Bread
Fresh Fruit

Supper
Japanese Soup
Red Bean Salad
Rice
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Apple Pie
Tea

Menu for the 2nd, 12th, and 22nd Days
Breakfast
Stewed Prunes
Oatmeal
Toast
Butter or Oleo
Milk

Dinner
Japanese Mixed
Rice w/Beef
Cabbage
Bean Sprouts
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Spice Cookies

Supper
Bean Soup
Pickled Beet Salad
Rice Pudding
Tea

Menu for the 3rd, 13th, and 23rd Days
Breakfast
Grapefruit
Cornmeal Mush
Milk
Rice
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Tea

Dinner
Sushi
Bread
Fried Potatoes
Escalloped Tomatoes
Bread Pudding
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Supper
Vegetable tempura
Noodles
Fried Onions
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Sliced Cheese
Crackers
Tea
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Menu for the 4th, 14th, and 24th Days
Breakfast
Stewed Raisins
Wheat Cereal
Milk
Fried Eggs
Fried Potatoes
Bread
Tea
Apple Butter

Dinner
Sukiyaki
Rice
Carrots
Onions
Bread
Cornstarch Pudding
Butter or Oleo

Supper
Spaghetti w/Cheese
& Tomato Sauce
Green Salad
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Tea

Menu for the 5th, 15th, and 25th Days
Breakfast
Grapefruit
Fried Rice
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Tea

Dinner
Chashu & Noodles
Spinach
Rice
Bread
Sweet Potato
Pudding

Supper
Japanese Soup
Boiled Beans
Fresh Pickled Cab
bage
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Sliced Cheese
Tea

Menu for the 6th, 16th, and 26th Days
Breakfast
Baked Apples
Wheat Cereal
French Toast
Sirup [sic]
Butter or Oleo
Tea

Dinner
Beef Heart
Boiled Potatoes
Celery
Bread
Fresh Pickled
Turnips
Rice Pudding

Supper
Egg Soup
Rice
Peas
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Jelly
Fruit Cocktail

Menu for the 7th, 17th, and 27th Days
Breakfast
Oranges
Oatmeal
Milk
Fried Potatoes
Bread
Apple Butter
Tea

Dinner
Veal Stew
String Beans
Rice
Bread
Butter or Oleo

Supper
Baked Beans
Vegetable Salad
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Oatmeal Cookies
Tea
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Menu for the 8th, 18th, and 28th Days
Breakfast
Tomato Juice
Oatmeal
Boiled Rice
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Tea
Toastie

Dinner
Scrambled Eggs &
Sliced Cheese
Rice
Boiled Lima Beans
Eggplant
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Bread Pudding

Supper
Fish Teriyaki
Boiled Noodles
Pickled Rutabagas
Bread
Apple Butter
Tea

Menu for the 9th, 19th, and 29th Days
Breakfast
Apples
Boiled Rice
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Tea

Dinner
Egg Foo Young
Shoyu Sauce
Rice
Spinach
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Cottage Pudding

Supper
Tomato Soup
Macaroni & Cheese
Sliced Onions
w/ Greens
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Tea

Menu for the 10th, 20th, and 30th Days
Breakfast
Oranges
Oatmeal
French Toast
Sirup [sic]
Tea

Dinner
Sukiyaki
Rice
Japanese Pickles
Escalloped Tomatoes
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Bread
Butter or Oleo

Supper
Potato & Celery Soup
Cabbage Roll w/
Tomato Sauce
Sweet Potatoes
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Prune Pudding
Tea

Japanese Menu, Prepared in Office of the Quartermaster
General, Washington, D.C., RG 160 Army Service Forces,
Office of the Commanding General, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Service Commands, Correspondence Files, 1943-45, 333.6
Prisoners of War, Form Class.
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MONTHLY PAY CHART FOR OFFICER PRISONERS
JAPANESE
ARMY
NAVY
PAY
128.91
Taisho
Taisho
Chu jo
113.29
Chu jo
Shosho
Shosho
97.66
Taisa
81.06
Taisa
Chusa
Chusa
62.90
Shosa
Shosa
45.51
Taii Itto Tokumu Taii 40.43
Taii Nito Taii Itto
37.11
Taii Santo Taii Nito
32.23
28.71
Taii Santo
Chui Itto Chui
Chui Nito Tokumu Chui 28.00
Shoi Shoi Tokumu Shoi 25.00

AMERICAN EQUIVALENT
ARMY
NAVY
Admiral
General
Lt General
Vice Admiral
Maj General
Rear Admiral
Captain
Colonel
Commander
Lt Colonel
Lt Commander
Major
Captain

Lieutenant

1st Lieutenant Lt(j.g .)
2nd Lieutenant Ensign

Information from TM 19-500, 25 April 1945, Change 4,
Section 3, Paragraph 9, p . 4.5.
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